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The 8th Austin Forum on Journalism 
in the Americas started hours after 
the assassination of a 21-year-old 
photojournalist of the Ciudad Juarez 
newspaper El Diario. (Another young 
journalist, an intern, barely survived the 
same attack.) The shocking news gave 
a gloomy tone to the conference, where 
almost 50 journalists and experts would 
discuss the coverage of drug trafficking and 
organized crime in many countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean.  It became a 
dramatic reminder of the seriousness and 
complexity of the forum’s topic.
Reporters and editors risk their lives, and 
many have been killed in the line of duty, 
as they tried their best to inform about the 
activities of criminal organizations. Mexico 
has become the most dangerous country 
for journalists, who found themselves as 
targets, in the middle of the crossfire of 
the so-called drug wars, especially on the 
border with the United States but also in 
many other regions. Drug trafficking and 
organized crime, however, is a widespread 
problem, affecting virtually all countries in 
Latin America and the Caribbean.
As we found out during the Austin Forum 
discussions, it is not only extremely dangerous 
to cover this issue, but also very complex to 
explain its real dimensions and implications. 
Drug trafficking and organized crime are a 
global plague with ramifications that cannot 
be understood through the traditional, body-
count-based local coverage. Its coverage 
poses some of the most difficult challenges 
journalists face in this hemisphere nowadays.
This book contains a series of articles by 
journalists and experts analyzing dilemmas 
journalists face as they cover this topic in the 
Americas. But they try also to delineate the 
real dimensions of the problem. The book is 
divided into five chapters. In the first chapter, 
Tyler Bridges, a veteran U.S. correspondent 
in Latin America, presents his account of 
the two days of discussions in Austin; in 
the second, University of Miami’s Professor 
Bruce Bagley explains the major trends of 
drug trafficking and organized crime in the 
region, from his academic perspectives; in 
the third, Colombian journalist Alvaro Sierra 
talks about the “the strange paradoxes of 
the drug coverage in the news;” the fourth 
chapter shows the findings of a study on the 
“spiral of violence” that is silencing the press 
in Mexico; and the fifth chapter is an analysis 
of the drug trafficking problem in Mexico and 
Central America by Samuel Gonzalez, former 
Mexican Chief Prosecutor Against Organized 
Crime.
We at the Knight Center for Journalism in 
the Americas are grateful for the immense 
support and inspiration given by the Open 
Society Foundations, through their Latin 
American and Media programs, and hope this 
book becomes a contribution to journalists in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. 
A ContRiBution to jouRnAlists  








open soCiety  
foundAtions proLogue
We present in this report a summary of 
the deliberations of nearly 50 journalists 
and academics from Latin America and 
the Caribbean to discuss media coverage 
of organized crime and drug trafficking 
in the continent. The Open Society Media 
Program and Latin America Program, in 
conjunction with the Knight Center for 
Journalism in the Americas at the University 
of Texas at Austin, gathered this group in 
the hope that efforts such as these benefit 
the journalism community in understanding 
the implications that organized crime has 
on societies and local communities, and to 
report on these implications.
We trust that this report will raise the 
understanding that covering organized 
crime requires a new approach, new 
tactics and new strategies. This is a global 
phenomenon that knows no borders and 
that speaks all languages. As such, cross-
border collaboration, and regional and 
global cooperation among those that try 
to uncover the realities of this business, is 
fundamental. Journalists in the region are 
re-thinking media coverage, and there is 
a need to go beyond the body count and 
focus on an in-depth analysis of the issues. 
In the socio-political context of the most 
affected regions, such as Mexico and 
Central America, with weak states and 
outrageous levels of impunity, it is all the 
more important for journalists to find 
effective ways to send the message across 
to societies that the role of journalists is vital 
to win this battle against organized crime. 
  the open society 
  foundations at the Austin forum
The Open Society Foundations have been 
collaborating with the Knight Center for 
Journalism in the Americas in defining 
topics for debate among professionals 
since 2007. In an effort to facilitate 
learning among fellow journalists, and 
combining forces to find solutions for some 
of the salient problems that journalism 
in Latin America faces, the Austin Forum 
has addressed  the topics of Freedom of 
Expression (2007), Investigative Journalism 
(2008), and new business models (2009). 
As a network of organizations and 
individuals with similar core values and 
understanding of the importance of 
journalism for democracy, governance and 
justice, the Austin Forum is the perfect host 
for discussions and debates of this nature. 
 
The Open Society Foundations wishes to 
thank Professor Rosental Alves and the 
staff of the Knight Center for Journalism in 
the Americas for their efforts on behalf of 
the journalism community in the region. 
Also, the Open Society Foundations wishes 
to thank Tyler Bridges, author of the 
conference brief, and furthermore to Bruce 
Bagley, Alvaro Sierra, and Samuel Gonzalez 
for the papers written for this conference. 
Finally, thanks to all of the participants for 
their intelligent contributions and for their 
passion. It gives us hope that independent, 
quality journalism can play a role in solving 
the problems facing Latin America. 
jouRnAlists, vitAl  
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Authorities make a big drug  
bust in Latin America. They seize a  
haul of drugs and nab a big fish. A 
newspaper’s police reporter covers the 
story and trumpets the authorities’ claim 
that they have dealt a mortal blow to a 
notorious drug cartel. Politicians hail the 
good news.
We’ve all seen these kinds of news stories. 
They typically are published on the front 
page and suggest that a scourge has been 
vanquished.
These stories may report all of the facts 
accurately. But they usually don’t tell an 
accurate story about drug traffickers and 
organized crime in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, three dozen journalists from 
throughout the region were told at the 
8th Austin Forum on Journalism in the 
Americas in mid-September, 2010, at the 
University of Texas.
The conference included tough self-
appraisals that cited the shortcomings of 
journalists in covering complicated stories 
involving drugs and organized crime.
“We have a lot of journalists who cover the 
news,” said Ricardo Trotti, the director of 
the Impunity Project at the Miami-based 
Inter American Press Association. “We 
don’t have many journalists who uncover 
the news.”
Drugs and organized crime have become 
so complex that simply covering them 
the same way won’t cut it anymore. That 
was a central theme that emerged as 
journalists from different countries offered 
their perspectives on the interrelated 
problems of drug trafficking and organized 
crime, at the event organized by the 
Knight Center for Journalism in the 
Americas at the University of Texas and the 
Open Society Foundations, which includes 
programs that focus on Latin America and 
the media.
The drug kingpins and organized crime 
bosses—who are often one and the 
CoveRAge of dRug tRAffiCking  
And oRgAnized CRime in lAtin AmeRiCA 
And the CARiBBeAn
the drug kingpins and organized crime bosses have extended their tentacles so 
deeply into civil society and the military that they are imperiling the fundamental 
principles of democracy, particularly in mexico but also in Central America. 
they are buying politicians, judges, police commanders and generals. they are 
silencing the media. they are killing those who won’t be intimidated or purchased. 
in that context the 8th Austin forum on Journalism in the Americas took place.









same—are constantly changing their 
business practices to keep one step ahead 
of authorities. Journalists have to change 
their ways to keep up, too.
Against that backdrop, here are the key 
lessons that were outlined during the two-
day conference:
*Drugs and organized crime are 
increasingly imitating successful 
corporations by becoming globalized 
enterprises. Borders are becoming mere 
artifices. For journalists, this means that 
simply examining the problems in their 
countries could easily mean missing a key 
part of the overall story that has spilled 
into other countries.
*Drug lords and organized crime bosses 
are increasingly preying on countries with 
malleable government officials whom they 
can corrupt and intimidate.
*Covering drugs and organized crime 
with police reporters means a superficial 
focus on the latest killings and not an 
examination of the more profound stories 
involving political corruption, the problems 
spawned by poverty and violence and such 
crimes as money laundering.
*Aggressive journalists need to understand 
that their work will likely prompt 
harassment from government officials put 
on the spot. The journalists could even be 
placed in danger, particularly in Colombia 
and Mexico.
*There is good news. Savvy  
journalists are implementing new  
tools to cover and report the drug  
problem, including blogs, social media,  
and websites that provide background on 
the bad guys and tips on how to uncover 
their activities.
The conference occurred at a time when 
the stakes are becoming higher. The drug 
kingpins and organized crime bosses 
have extended their tentacles so deeply 
into civil society and the military that 
they are imperiling the fundamental 
principles of democracy, particularly in 
Mexico but also in Central America. They 
are buying politicians, judges, police 
commanders, and generals. They are 
silencing the media. They are killing 
those who won’t be intimidated or 
purchased.
A reminder of the stakes came when the 
journalists arrived in Austin and learned 
that gunmen only hours earlier had gunned 
down Luis Carlos Santiago, a 21-year-old 
photographer at El Diario newspaper in 
Ciudad Juárez. The attack also wounded an 
18-year-old newspaper intern.
Outraged at the news, the journalists in 
Texas spontaneously drafted the “Austin 
Declaration.” It demanded that the Mexican 
government take measures to protect 
journalists at risk. 
“We haVe a lot  
of Journalists Who 
CoVer the neWs� We 
don’t haVe many 
Journalists Who 
unCoVer the neWs�” 
Ricardo trotti, the director of the 
impunity project at the miami-based 








  the “Balloon” and 
  “Cockroach” effects
Just a few years ago, the drugs and 
organized crime story was simpler. Drugs, 
particularly cocaine, flowed from South 
America to the United States.
But now, according to the 2010 report of 
the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime, cocaine is increasingly becoming 
the drug of choice in Europe and elsewhere 
in South America.
The number of cocaine users in the United 
States has dropped from 10.5 million in 
1982 to 5.3 million in 2008, reported the 
U.N. agency. The United States remained 
the biggest dollar market for cocaine ($37 
billion in estimated sales), but Europe was 
gaining rapidly ($34 billion).
The United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, and 
Germany are becoming lucrative markets 
in Europe. In South America the big 
markets are Brazil and Argentina.
Because the Uribe government cracked 
down on coca growing in Colombia during 
its eight years in office, drug traffickers 
have been planting more and more coca in 
Peru and Bolivia—and most of the cocaine 
that is refined from the raw coca leaves in 
those two countries now goes to Europe 
and South America.
Bruce Bagley, who chairs the Department 
of International Studies at the University of 
Miami, labeled it the “balloon effect.” If you 
squeeze one area, it will pop up elsewhere.
As the U.N. agency described it: “As the 
Colombian Government has taken greater 
control of its territory, traffickers are 
making more use of transit countries in the 
region, including the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela and Ecuador.
“Mexican drug cartels emerged over 
the last 10 to 15 years as the primary 
organizers for shipments of cocaine into 
the United States, largely replacing the 
previously dominant Colombian groups. In 
response to Mexican enforcement efforts, 
Central American countries are increasingly 
being used as transit countries. West Africa 
started to be used as a way station to 
Europe around 2004.
“The situation remains fluid, and the 
impact on transit countries can be 
devastating.”
Bagley is particularly adept at defining 
problems. He has devised the term “the 
cockroach effect,” which describes how the 
drug traffickers have scurried away from 
government heat in Mexico and Colombia 
to operate more freely elsewhere.
Claudia Mendez Arriaza, a reporter for 
elPeriodico in Guatemala, sees the spillover 
of the “balloon” and “cockroach” effects in 
her coverage.
“I imagine someone who is fumigating 
his house,” said Mendez Arriaza, picking 
up on Bagley’s analogy. “Where do 
the cockroaches go? To the house of a 
neighbor who is trying to recover from past 
problems. That describes the situation in 
Guatemala.”
Two of the country’s former national police 
chiefs have been jailed on drug charges. In 
June, Guatemala’s highest court removed 
the country’s attorney general, after 
he had been accused of having links to 
organized crime and had caused an uproar 








from important cases. The moves seemed 
aimed at weakening the justice system.
Mendez Arriaza noted that the U.S. 
Department of State has estimated that 75 
percent of the drugs that enter the United 
States pass through Guatemala.
Some 98 percent of crimes go unpunished 
in Guatemala, where the weak justice 
system has minimal capacity to handle 
common crimes, especially when it 
comes to organized crime. That’s why the 
direct intervention of the United Nations 
was sought to create a commission that 
functions like an international sheriff in the 
country. 
Besides Guatemala, drug traffickers’ 
activities have leaked into neighboring 
countries.
“In addition to Guatemala, Honduras, and 
El Salvador are most heavily threatened 
by the spread of the Mexican traffickers,” 
Bagley said.
Carlos Dada, founder of El Faro, an 
online newspaper in El Salvador, said that 
authorities there recently found five barrels 
stashed with a total of $15 million. “We 
believe that it’s drug traffickers’ money,” 
Dada said. “El Salvador is the place today 
where organized crime is trying to take 
over a state. They’ve already tried in 
Guatemala.
“The army has been penetrated in 
Honduras and Guatemala,” Dada added. 
“That hasn’t happened yet in El Salvador. 
El Salvador doesn’t have room for 
clandestine airstrips.”
Dada and El Faro have been recognized for 
their tough, uncompromising reporting in 
the digital age. But the drug phenomenon 
has left him flummoxed.
“We don’t know how to cover all of this,” 
Dada said, adding, “We know we shouldn’t 
cover it as a body count.”
As the U.N. report noted, Venezuela 
has also become a notorious drug 
transshipment point. “Between 2006 and 
2008, over half of all detected maritime 
shipments of cocaine to Europe came from 
Venezuela,” the agency reported.
Caribbean countries also have become 
transshipment points, in yet another 
manifestation of the balloon and cockroach 
effects.
Gotson Pierre, a journalist with AlterPresse 
in Haiti, said the United Nations has 
reported that drug traffickers have 
reestablished clandestine airstrips on the 
island nation, following the devastating 
January 12 earthquake.
Pierre also said that drug traffickers have 
acquired so much political muscle that “the 
United Nations believes that the upcoming 
“in response to 
meXiCan enforCement 
efforts, Central 
ameriCan Countries are 
inCreasingly Being used 
as transit Countries�”
Bruce Bagley, department of 









presidential elections could be at risk 
of being financed by ‘the fruit of illegal 
activities,’ especially drug trafficking.”
(It’s worth noting that many journalists, 
including María Teresa Ronderos, from 
Colombia, don’t accept the police version 
that presents organized crime groups as 
big and organized. Instead, she believes, 
they represent a welter of interests that 
are often in conflict and not easy to cover.)
  preying on the Weak
So many countries have gone from 
military dictatorships to elected civilian 
governments during the past 30 years 
that strong democratic institutions have 
yet to fully take root. Ruthless and agile, 
drug lords and organized crime bosses 
have exploited those weaknesses to set up 
flourishing enterprises that buy off and kill 
opponents.
“There are many weak states in Latin 
America,” Bagley said. “The transition 
from authoritarianism to democracy 
weakens traditional institutions. You don’t 
immediately create new institutions to 
control them. Mexico is going through this 
transition now.”
The PRI operated a one-party “democracy” 
in Mexico for 71 years until Vicente 
Fox was elected president in 2000. 
Other political parties and government 
institutions haven’t been strong enough to 
fill the gap. That has created an opening 
for the drug traffickers, who make huge 
profits by smuggling cocaine, heroin, and 
marijuana to the United States.
Samuel Gonzalez, an independent 
analyst who formerly headed the Mexican 
government’s unit against organized 
crime, described a country in deep trouble. 
Gonzalez said violence in Mexico has 
increased by 50 percent in the past two 
years. Drug money finances the country’s 
political parties, he added. Practically no 
one is punished for committing a crime.
“When you have total impunity, it shouldn’t 
be a surprise that you have a total war,” 
Gonzalez said.
Michael O’Connor has spent the past two 
years in Mexico chronicling how these 
developments have spawned attacks 
against journalists and silenced the press, 
especially in Northern Mexico. O’Connor 
is an investigator for the New York-based 
Committee to Protect Journalists. His 
group reports that one Mexican journalist 
had been killed on the job from January 
through September 2010 while the motives 
in the murder of another seven had yet to 
be established.
Organized crime figures “have effective 
control over large parts of territory,” 
O’Connor said. “One of the first things they 
do when they move into a territory is take 
over the local press. It may not be the first 
thing they do but it’s on their to-do list.
“When they move into town,” O’Connor 
added, “they will change the local power 
structure: the mayor, the police, the local 
army commander. They do not want the 
press reporting that. That’s a great story. 
When your mayor is being corrupted by 
someone else, that’s a great story.”
As a result, O’Connor said, “some reporters 
get paid off.” The drug traffickers “threaten 
those who won’t get paid off. If nothing 








Perhaps no city in Mexico has suffered 
more than Ciudad Juárez, across the 
border from El Paso. Few reporters have 
chronicled the city’s agony more vividly 
than Judith Torrea, an independent 
journalist and blogger from Spain who 
lived for a time in New York. Torrea told 
the Austin conferees that watching people 
in New York tranquilly consume the cocaine 
that was causing so many deaths in Juárez 
helped convince her to return to the 
Mexican border city. 
“I began to ask myself many questions 
about the so-called drug war,” Torrea said. 
“Every two months, I traveled to Juárez 
and I found out that my sources had been 
killed, but they weren’t drug traffickers, 
as President Calderón had justified in 
explaining so many deaths. A moment 
arrived when I decided I had to return 
to tell the stories that had to be told. My 
heart may have been born in Spain, but 
it’s pure Juárez.” She publishes the widely-
read blog “Ciudad Juárez, en la sombra del 
narcotráfico” (http://juarezenlasombra.
blogspot.com/). Torrea won Spain’s 
Ortega y Gasset Prize in 2010 for Digital 
Journalism.
 Torrea said that residents live in a 
militarized city under siege, where the 
drug cartels fight savagely for the right to 
control the drugs transported by boat from 
Colombia that will pass through Juárez on 
their way to the United States. She said 
that since the federal government sent 
troops to Ciudad Juárez, the number of 
assassinations has soared. A government 
human rights commission has documented 
significant increases in extortions, 
kidnappings, and other human rights 
violations committed against the city’s 
population.
“The danger has become more 
democratic,” Torrea said. “Now the danger 
is in being alive. What remains from the 
so-called drug war are more than 10,000 
orphans who also belong to Mexican 
authorities. If they don’t do anything, 
these orphans will become the hired guns 
who today are cutting off heads.”
Torrea said that more than 7,200 killings 
have occurred since 2008 when the so-
called drug war began, backed by the 
army and the federal police. The city, 
with a population of slightly more than 
1.3 million, now experiences 6 to 27 
murders per day, according to official 
statistics.
“Some 116,000 houses have been 
abandoned, according to the Juárez 
mayor’s office, and 10,000 businesses 
have been closed, according to the 
National Chamber of Commerce,” Torrea 
said. “The vitality of life in Ciudad Juárez 
no longer exists. And this is spreading little 
by little to the neighboring city of El Paso, 
where thousands of Juárez residents have 
fled, along with their businesses. Almost 
97 percent of the crimes go unpunished, 
according to figures from the Attorney 
General.”
“We don’t KnoW hoW 
to CoVer all of this� 
We KnoW We shouldn’t 
CoVer it as a Body 
Count�”
Carlos dada, founder of el faro, an 








Three days after the murder of 
photographer Luis Carlos Santiago, El 
Diario de Juárez—the newspaper with the 
highest circulation in what is perhaps the 
most violent city in the world—published 
a front-page editorial where it asked the 
drug cartels to explain what they could and 
couldn’t publish, to avoid more attacks.
The editorial had the effect of shining an 
international spotlight on the government’s 
weakness in Juárez, where journalists 
continue working in a city where virtually 
all other institutions have collapsed. That 
same week, the investigative unit of 
El Diario published a front-page report 
that raised doubts about the optimistic 
statements offered by Mexico’s president 
regarding the investigation of another one 
of the paper’s assassinated journalists. 
Those statements were based on highly 
questionable confessions from suspects 
who had had been repeatedly tortured.
“The city that I love is falling apart,” Torrea 
told the journalists in Austin. “Freedom of 
the press no longer exists. The pressures 
not to report anything are growing ever 
more powerful.”
She paused. “I can’t say more. I’m getting 
emotional,” she said.
  the elephant in the room
Speakers in Austin made it clear that too 
many journalists in Latin America and the 
Caribbean are not trained to do the spade 
work needed to spotlight the misdeeds by 
sophisticated crime networks. “There’s a lot 
of coverage, but it’s very superficial,” said 
Alvaro Sierra, a Colombian who teaches at 
the Universidad para la Paz en Costa Rica. 
“Police reporters usually cover the drug 
story. They focus on the body count. It’s 
very clear how to cover the first murder or 
the tenth. It’s not clear how to cover the 
fiftieth and one-hundredth. Drugs, their 
production, consumption, and trafficking 
are a complex global phenomenon, not 
a local police story, and they should be 
treated accordingly in the media.”
Sierra added that drug reporters need to 
expand their sources of information
“One of the big problems is that the media 
become kind of the carrier of the official 
narrative,” he said. “We cover the war 
on drugs, and we don’t cover the rich 
academic and public debate on drugs and 
drug policies. The media should have a 
more independent narrative. That doesn’t 
mean not using official sources. They are 
important. But we should develop other 
sources, and not limit the media story to 
the official versions of the so-called ‘war 
on drugs’ or the ‘war on narcos’ in Mexico, 
which consist mainly of one killing after the 
other, hunted-down kingpins and tons of 
drugs or millions of dollars seized.”
Claudia Mendez Arriaza sees a similar 
problem in her country.
“I don’t see a policy for covering drug 
trafficking in Guatemala,” she said. “We 
cover an attack or a killing. The media 
react to events. We never get to the root 
of the problem.”
Ana Arana, director of the Mexico City-
based MEPI Foundation, which promotes 
investigative reporting and freedom of the 
press, pinpointed a major problem.
“Provincial reporters aren’t trained well,” 








The problems in Mexico are deep-rooted 
and long-standing, said Michael O’Connor, 
dashing hopes of anyone who thought 
there could be a quick resolution to the 
problems.
“There’s a history, especially in the states, 
of corruption in the Mexican press, from 
the newest reporter to owner,” said 
O’Connor. “There’s a history of endemic 
corruption. The government is the biggest 
advertiser in states. That gives the 
government enormous control. When your 
biggest advertiser says don’t run a story, 
you don’t run it.”
O’Connor added, “There’s a history of 
influence by local political and economic 
elites.”
The shortcomings in Mexico add up to 
a shameful result, O’Connor said. “The 
Mexican press is doing a terrible job of 
covering the [drugs] story.”
The comments by O’Connor and the 
others prompted Bruce Bagley to jump in. 
“Nobody’s talking about the elephant in 
the room,” Bagley said. “How can we have 
professional, well-paid reporters?”
No one had a good answer, although 
Gustavo Gorriti, a long-time Peruvian 
journalist who now runs an online 
investigative reporting site, heaped blame 
on newspaper owners for not doing 
enough.
Gorriti described an incident where a 
Mexican newspaper sent a reporter to 
Ciudad Juárez, without any preparation for 
the dangerous conditions. The hotel where 
the paper sent the reporter to stay was 
chosen not because it offered a safe haven, 
but because it offered a cheap price.
“The taxi driver out front already knew 
who the reporter was,” Gorriti said, telling 
the story to illustrate a larger point: “The 
negligence in how editors send reporters 
to conflict zones is terrible. Media owners 
want to spend as little as possible.”
It’s not just the owners of Mexico’s 
newspapers and TV networks that have 
to do more to protect reporters. The 
government must do more, too, said 
Marcela Turati, a free-lance journalist 
in Mexico City who writes for Proceso 
magazine and has organized “Red de 
Periodistas de a Pie” (Journalists on Foot). 
The group is pushing for safer conditions 
for journalists.
Turati and others are trying to reverse a 
situation where Mexico City’s journalists 
have shown little concern for the plight of 
journalists getting killed in the provinces.
Turati helped organize a march that 
attracted more than 1,000 journalists 
“ViolenCe in meXiCo has 
inCreased By 50 perCent 
in the past tWo years� 
drug money finanCes 
the Country’s politiCal 
parties� praCtiCally 
no one is punished for 
Committing a Crime�”
samuel gonzalez, an independent 
analyst who formerly headed the 









in early August in Mexico City. “Ni Uno 
Más” (Not One More) was the theme. 
The marchers showed solidarity with the 
slain journalists and demanded that the 
government prevent others from getting 
gunned down.
“It was a break-through moment,” said 
Turati. “We gained confidence and told 
everyone that we care about what happens 
to journalists.”
Mónica González, a veteran journalist in 
Chile who founded a powerful investigative 
news website, Ciper-Chile, applauded 
Turati’s efforts.
“When ego and fear get in the way, we 
become our own worst enemies,” said 
González, who was jailed by the Pinochet 
government because of her aggressive 
reporting. “If journalists don’t study 
the new situation, if we don’t prepare 
ourselves, if we don’t organize ourselves to 
act as a team instead of simply reacting, 
nothing will change. The only way to have 
an impact that helps citizens is through 
pressure.”
Marco Lara Klahr, an independent 
investigative journalist and analyst with the 
Instituto para la Seguridad y la Democracia 
(Institute for Security and Democracy), a 
human rights group based in Mexico City, 
gave a tough critique of journalists and 
violence.
Lara Klahr said that journalists are feeding 
Mexico’s downward spiral by playing up 
bloodshed and violence in their coverage. 
The news reports, he added, too often lack 
context, nuance, and confirmation of the 
facts provided by the government.
“We feed the monster,” Lara said, citing the 
words of a photographer-reporter in the 
state of Morelos.
  push-Back
Ginna Morelo faces the threat of attack 
from right-wing paramilitary squads and 
their offshoots, which go by names such as 
“The Black Eagles” and “Castano’s Heroes.” 
These groups have become active again 
through extortions, kidnappings, and drug 
trafficking. They kill with impunity.
But Morelo is tough and willing to stand 
her ground. She is a reporter at El 
Meridiano, a newspaper in Montería, a city 
in northwestern Colombia.
Morelo’s investigative articles have angered 
powerful forces in local government and 
criminal networks.
“There are some who say you can’t 
compare eras, that now is better than 
before, when paramilitary groups reigned 
in the region and allied with politicians to 
become the new power brokers,” Morelo 
said. “Many journalists believe, to the 
contrary, that the situation has worsened. 
The criminals have changed their ways of 
doing business in an astonishing number 
of ways. Too many of them act freely in 
Córdoba and throughout the country. 
They are winning the legal battle and 
sowing anguish that has eaten our soul for 
decades.”
The account by Morelo and several other 
journalists demonstrated how hard-hitting 
reporting often produces an unpleasant 
push-back.








latest investigative article is published, 
before tackling her next assignment.
“My next story will be on sex and drugs 
involving underage children,” Morelo said, 
before adding, “I don’t want people to cry 
over my reports. I want them to really 
understand what’s happening, and to 
understand where we’re going.”
The pressure faced by journalists like 
Javier Mayorca in Venezuela comes 
from the government of President Hugo 
Chávez. Seeing himself as a latter-day 
Simón Bolívar, Chávez believes that he is 
pushing Venezuela into the pantheon of 
great nations, through what he calls “21st 
Century Socialism.”
He brooks little criticism.
Chávez’s government has been quick 
to attack newspapers and TV stations 
that report unflattering news, especially 
accounts that describe how Venezuela 
has become an important cocaine 
transshipment point.
Mayorca, who reports for El Nacional in 
Caracas, is among the journalists who 
have been frozen out by angry government 
officials.
“We’ve had to change our strategies to 
have access to sources,” Mayorca said. 
“Since 2005, our main sources have been 
drug certification reports from the United 
Nations and the U.S. State Department. 
We can only get the information extra-
officially.”
El Nacional and El Universal—two of 
Caracas’ most important dailies—refuse 
to be cowed by Chávez. Globovision, an 
independent TV station, has also refused to 
knuckle under to Chávez.
In Jamaica, the Gleaner newspaper 
showed its courage when it continued to 
aggressively report a controversial 2009 
extradition request by the United States 
for Christopher Coke, on charges of gun 
running and drug trafficking. Coke was a 
particularly notorious crime boss with a 
fervent following in his neighborhood.
Byron Buckley, a Gleaner editor, told 
the Austin conferees that the police 
passed along intelligence to the Gleaner 
and another media company, RJR 
Communications Co., “that both entities 
were under threat by elements supportive 
of Coke.”
Complicating matters, Buckley said, Coke 
“was a known supporter of the governing 
Jamaica Labour Party and a resident of the 
West Kingston constituency represented 
by the Prime Minister of Jamaica. The 
political enclave of Tivoli Gardens, in West 
Kingston, has been described by a former 
army/police chief as the ‘mother of all 
garrisons.’”
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The Gleaner and RJR took precautions, 
Buckley said, but they continued their 
aggressive reporting. “Over the 12-month 
period since the U.S. made the extradition 
request, The Gleaner print and online 
editions together published more than 
1,000 stories, letters, commentaries, and 
editorial leaders on the topic.”
Coke refused to surrender. Pressured in 
part by the relentless media coverage, the 
Jamaican government sent in troops to 
capture Coke. A bloody gun battle ensued, 
but Coke was finally caught and extradited 
to the United States.
“The media, by its own advocacy, 
coverage, as well as giving a voice to civil 
society, played a significant role in the 
outcome of the request by the U.S. for the 
extradition of Coke,” Buckley concluded.
  new tools
Drug trafficking gangs are devising new 
ways to keep the illegal profits flowing. 
Journalists are adapting, too. The Inter 
American Press Association is holding 
workshops for journalists in Latin America 
that teach them how to work more safely 
in conflict areas.
The Digital Journalism Center at the 
University of Guadalajara is offering virtual 
seminars on how to work ethically and 
safely.
Journalists such as Judith Torrea in Ciudad 
Juárez, Mónica González in Santiago, and 
Carlos Dada in San Salvador—and other 
organizations in Mexico, such as Red 
de Periodistas de a Pie—are producing 
innovative blogs and online newspapers.
One of the best sources for information 
on the drug war in Mexico comes from a 
surprise source. It is blogdelnarco.com. 
David Sasaki, a specialist in new media at 
the Open Society Foundations, called it “a 
citizen replacement for a media that’s been 
silenced. They publish photos of sons and 
daughters of narcos. They have a Facebook 
account. They put information on attack 
plans, on the guns [the drug traffickers] 
have, how much drugs they sell. You’ll 
see photos of narco-bloqueos on Twitter 
accounts.”
The identity of the blog’s publisher is not 
known. “It’s impossible for us to judge the 
motivation of the blogger,” Sasaki said, 
raising an obvious red flag. “He accepts 
content from anyone. He wants to put 
on as much as possible. He doesn’t filter 
anything. Blogdelnarco has more readers 
than Reforma and El Norte in Monterrey 
and the main paper in Torreón.”
Other online tools are increasingly 
becoming available for reporters. 
One of the most exciting is Cosecha 
Roja, sponsored by the Open Society 
Foundations and the Fundación Nuevo 
Periodismo Iberamericano. (Go to: http://
cosecharoja.fnpi.org/)
Published in Spanish, the new site aims to 
provide an all-in-one place that aggregates 
news on violence in Latin America and 
gives journalists a site where they can 
exchange information, post articles, and 
debate ideas.
“Traditional journalism is in crisis,” said 
Cristian Alarcon, an Argentine who is a 
founder of the site. “We’re looking for new 








A second site is the Investigative 
Dashboard, which provides “tools for 
international reporters to follow the 
money.” It is the brainchild of Paul Radu, a 
Romanian journalist who honed his project 
as a Knight Fellow at Stanford University. 
(Go to: http://investigativedashboard.org/
Radu discussed a recent trip to the tri-
border region of Argentina, Brazil, and 
Paraguay that authorities have identified 
as a prime spot for smuggling cocaine, 
weapons, and knock-off electronic devices.
Steve Dudley, who was formerly based 
in Colombia for the Miami Herald, has 
created another site that will feature 
detailed information in English and 
Spanish. Called InSight, it will feature 
a small team of researchers who 
will monitor, analyze and investigate 
the phenomenon of organized crime 
throughout Latin America. The site is 
financed by the Open Society Foundations, 
the Fundación Ideas para la Paz (based 
in Bogotá), and American University 
in Washington, D.C. (Go to: www.
InSightCrime.org)
InSight will help journalists put together 
the disparate pieces of an organized crime 
or drug story, Dudley said. “It will depend 
on the collaboration of reporters like you 
regionwide to succeed,” he added.
Even though journalists in Latin America 
and the Caribbean face difficulties in 
covering drug trafficking and organized 
crime, they are meeting some of these 
challenges with new tools to improve their 
work.
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information that makes issues invisible
By marco lara klahr
Historically, there is a paradox in news coverage of crime and violence throughout 
Latin America. The media industry and journalists in general often rely on official 
information that is unreliable and unverifiable (and even fictional). We then 
disseminate this information widely among the population, often treating it more 
as infotainment and less as serious news.
This information often makes the inefficiency and corruption of police and judicial 
institutions invisible, and gives the impression that they are functioning because, 
according to them—through their accounts that we as journalists help validate—“all 
individuals who are apprehended or killed are the worst criminals.”
We have ended up becoming appendages of a criminal policy that demonizes, 
stigmatizes, and violates the due process rights of citizens who have entered 
into real or perceived conflict with criminal law, while enabling very high levels 
of impunity. (The non-profit Center of Research for Development—CIDAC, for 
example, says this could rise to 98.3 in Mexico).
When journalists are attacked and silenced by the same inefficient and corrupt 
criminal justice system that they often help legitimize on a daily basis, it highlights 
the grave paradox that journalists face: they are both facilitators and victims of a 












Eight key trends or patterns are 
highlighted: 1) the globalization of 
drug consumption; 2) the limited or 
“partial victories” and unintended 
consequences of the U.S.-led “War 
on Drugs,” especially in the Andes; 
3) the proliferation of areas of drug 
cultivation and of drug smuggling 
routes throughout the hemisphere 
(balloon effects); 4) the dispersion and 
fragmentation of organized criminal 
groups or networks within countries 
and across sub-regions (cockroach 
effects); 5) the failure of political 
reform and state-building efforts 
(deinstitutionalization effects); 6) 
the inadequacies or failures of U.S. 
domestic drug and crime control 
policies (demand control failures); 7) 
the ineffectiveness of regional and 
international drug control policies 
(regulatory failures); and 8) the 
growth in support for harm reduction, 
decriminalization, and legalization 
policy alternatives (legalization debate).
  the globalization 
  of drug Consumption
Many Latin American political leaders have 
long argued that if the U.S. population 
did not consume so many illegal drugs—if 
there were not so many American drug 
addicts and users— then Latin American 
countries would not produce large 
quantities of illegal drugs like marijuana, 
cocaine, and heroin for export, and the 
region would not be plagued by the 
powerful and well-financed drug trafficking 
organizations—often called cartels—that 
have sprung up in the region over the 
last 25 years. It is certainly accurate to 
claim that the United States has been for 
decades, and remains today, the largest 
single consumer market for illicit drugs on 
the planet. Although there is no definitive 
estimate, the value of all illicit drugs sold 
annually in the United States may reach as 
high as US $150 billion. Some $40 billion 
per year may be spent on cocaine alone.
Nonetheless, illegal drug use (and/or 
addiction) is not a uniquely “American” 
disease, despite the title of David Musto’s 
famous book on the topic. Over the last 
decade, the current 27 member states of 
dRug tRAffiCking And  
oRgAnized CRime in the AmeRiCAs: 
mAjoR tRends in the 21st CentuRY
Analysis of the major trends that have characterized the evolution  
of illicit drug trafficking and organized criminal networks in the Americas  
over the last 25 years, with special emphasis on the main transformations  
or adaptations—economic, political and organizational—that have taken  
place within the region’s illegal drug economy during the first decade of the 
21st century. 








the European Union have rapidly equaled 
or surpassed the approximately 6 million 
regular cocaine users found in the United 
States. Indeed, levels of cocaine use in 
the United States have remained roughly 
steady over the last 10-15 years while 
cocaine consumption in Europe exploded 
exponentially during the first decade of the 
21st century. Moreover, the Europeans pay 
roughly three times as much per gram, 
ounce, kilo or metric ton as do American 
consumers. Indeed, the American market 
has for the last two decades absorbed 
some 320-350 metric tons of cocaine 
annually; Europe today is estimated to 
import some 300-320 metric tons each 
year, while consuming significantly higher 
amounts of heroin per capita. Over the 
last decade or more, the bulk of the heroin 
consumed in Europe has come from 
Afghanistan (over 90 percent of world 
production), whereas most of the heroin 
consumed in the United States comes 
from either Colombia (roughly 2 percent 
of world supply) or Mexico (roughly 
1.5 percent of world supply). Cocaine, 
in contrast, is produced only in three 
countries of the Western hemisphere: 
Colombia (40-45 percent), Peru (35-40 
percent), and Bolivia (15-20 percent). 
Cocaine is trafficked from these three 
Andean countries to consumer markets 
around the globe.
Cocaine consumption is not limited only 
to advanced capitalist markets such as 
those of the United States and Europe. 
Cocaine use in Latin America has also 
skyrocketed over the last decade. Indeed, 
Latin American consumers in 2010 were 
estimated to absorb over 200 metric 
tons of cocaine. Until 2009, Brazil was 
considered to be the world’s second largest 
market for cocaine behind only the United 
States. In its 2010 World Drug Report, the 
United Nations reported that Argentina 
had replaced Brazil as the second biggest 
cocaine consumer while Brazil was ranked 
third and Spain was ranked fourth. 
Cocaine consumption rates in Russia, 
Eastern Europe, and Asia also appear to 
be increasing rapidly. The dramatic rises 
in European and South American cocaine 
consumption specifically have greatly 
expanded world market demand for 
this illicit Andean product over the past 
decade. As a consequence, a pronounced 
trend toward the proliferation of new 
global trafficking routes and the increased 
involvement of criminal trafficking 
networks originating outside the Andean 
sub-region has become increasingly 
evident.
  partial Victories in the War on drugs
From the middle of the 19th century 
through the mid-1980s, Peru and Bolivia 
were the two principal country-suppliers 
of both coca leaf and of refined cocaine 
to the U.S., European and other world 
markets. As of 1985, Peru produced 
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roughly 65 percent of the world’s 
supply of coca leaf while Bolivia grew 
approximately 25 percent and Colombia 
10 percent or less. With the “partial 
victories” achieved by the U.S.-led war on 
drugs in the southern Andes during the 
late 1980s and early 1990s—specifically, 
U.S.-financed crop eradication programs 
in Bolivia’s Chapare province under 
President Victor Paz Estenssoro after 
1986 (Operation Blast Furnace), and 
Hugo Banzer after 1998 (Plan Dignidad), 
and Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori’s 
interruption of the “air bridge” between 
the Alto Huallaga growing area in Peru 
and Colombia in the mid-1990s—coca 
cultivation in the Andes rapidly shifted to 
Colombia in the mid- and late 1990s. By 
2000, Colombia cultivated an estimated 
90 percent of the world’s coca leaf while 
production in Peru and Bolivia dwindled to 
historic lows.  
In the early 1990s, Colombia’s U.S.-backed 
all-out war against drug lord Pablo Escobar 
and the Medellín cartel during the Cesar 
Gaviria administration led to Escobar’s 
death on December 2, 1993, and the 
rapid dissolution of the Medellín cartel. 
Subsequent plea bargaining in 1994-95 
during the Ernesto Samper administration 
with the major drug lords of the Cali 
cartel, specifically the Rodriguez Orejuela 
brothers, catalyzed the dismantling of 
the Cali cartel. While some large criminal 
trafficking networks (e.g., the Cartel 
del Norte del Valle) and some 300-plus 
smaller drug trafficking organizations 
(known as cartelitos) continued to operate 
in Colombia in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, by the late 1990s an unanticipated 
and unintended consequence of the demise 
of the country’s two major cartels was the 
emergence of Colombia’s leftwing FARC 
guerrillas and rightwing AUC paramilitary 
groups as the major controllers of coca 
leaf cultivation throughout Colombia. 
The rise of these two groups of armed 
illegal actors led to increased drug-related 
violence, as FARC and the AUC sought to 
eliminate each other and to consolidate 
their territorial control over drug cultivation 
regions across the country.
The spiral of violence in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s resulted in Colombia 
becoming one of the most dangerous 
and violent countries in the world. In 
July 2000, President Clinton and the U.S. 
government responded by backing the 
Andres Pastrana administration in its war 
against runaway drug trafficking via the 
adoption of Plan Colombia. In August 
2002, the newly inaugurated government 
of Alvaro Uribe received additional drug 
war assistance from Washington and 
the Bush administration in the wake of 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United 
States. Supported by some $8 billion in 
U.S. Plan Colombia aid over the decade, 
by 2010 Colombian President Uribe and 
his program of “democratic security” 
had managed to beat back the FARC 
guerrillas, demobilize many—if not 
all—of the country’s paramilitary bands 
and substantially reduce the country’s 
astronomically high levels of drug-related 
violence.
Despite the substantial achievement 
of Plan Colombia and the Uribe 
administration, Colombia in 2010 still 
remained the principal source of coca 
leaf and refined cocaine in the Andes, 
and drug-related violence and criminality 
appeared to be on the rise once again. 
Most importantly, clearly as an unintended 
consequence of the U.S.-backed war 
on drugs in Colombia, the locus of 








trafficking gradually shifted northwards 
from Colombia to Mexico. As the Uribe 
administration succeeded in Colombia, 
the major drug trafficking networks in 
Mexico took advantage of the vacuum 
left in the drug trade to seize control of 
cocaine smuggling operations into the 
United States. As a consequence, drug-
related violence and criminality shifted 
northwards into Mexican territory as 
various Mexican trafficking organizations 
vied for control over the still highly 
lucrative smuggling trade from Colombia 
and the Andes into the large and 
profitable U.S. market.
 Thus, Mexico’s current drug-related 
bloodbath is, in part, directly attributable 
to the partial victory in the war on drugs 
achieved in Colombia in recent years via 
Plan Colombia. If Mexico’s U.S.-backed 
Merida Initiative achieves results similar 
to those of Plan Colombia, it will not halt 
drug trafficking or end organized crime 
in Mexico or the region. The most likely 
outcome is that it will drive both further 
underground in Mexico while pushing many 
smuggling activities and criminal network 
operations into neighboring countries such 
as Guatemala and Honduras or back to 
Colombia and the Andes.
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  proliferation of Areas of 
  Cultivation and smuggling routes
The 2010 World Drug Report indicates 
that Colombia has successfully reduced 
the total number of hectares under coca 
cultivation within its national territory 
since 2008, although it has still not 
returned to pre-2000 levels. How large 
the reductions in coca cultivation in the 
past few years have actually been in 
Colombia is a controversial topic, plagued 
by inadequate data and methodological 
problems. Coca cultivation in both Peru 
and Bolivia has once again begun to 
expand. Most observers believe that 
overall coca leaf production and cocaine 
availability remain roughly on par with 
2000 levels and well above those of 1990 
or 1995. Evidently, the balloon effect that 
allowed coca cultivation to shift north 
from Bolivia and Peru to Colombia in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s continues to 
operate as cultivation moves back into 
Peru and Bolivia from Colombia at the end 
of the first decade of the 2000s. Various 
observers have noted the possibility 
that the tropical variety of coca— known 
in Portuguese as Epadu— might well 
balloon coca cultivation from its traditional 
growing areas on the eastern slopes of 
the Andes into Brazil and elsewhere in the 
Amazon basin in coming years, if ongoing 
or renewed eradication efforts prove 
successful in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru.
The 2010 UN report indicates a 10-20 
percent decline in coca production in 
Colombia during 2008 and 2009. But 
enthusiasm regarding such statistics 
should be tempered by realism. First, it 
is important to note that year-to-year 
variations are commonplace; declines 
over several years are required to 
identify enduring trends. Second, the 
UN statistics are approximations along a 
range rather than firm data points; it is 
entirely possible that this year’s or last 
year’s UN reports underestimate the real 
levels of production. Third, innovations 
in more productive hybrid plants, yields-
per-hectare, and processing can produce 
higher levels of cocaine than anticipated 
by the UN experts. Finally, the ongoing 
decentralization of cultivation in Colombia 
makes accurate mapping of the total 
numbers of hectares under cultivation a 
very problematic endeavor. 
Such caveats aside, the key reason that 
Colombia appears to have witnessed a 
significant decline in coca production 
in 2008 and 2009 is that the Uribe 
government moved away from its almost 
exclusive (U.S.-backed) reliance on aerial 
spraying to a more effective mixture of 
spraying and manual eradication linked to 
comprehensive alternative development 
programs in key coca growing areas such 
as La Macarena. In combination with 
the weakening of FARC control in vast 
stretches of rural Colombia and the partial 
demobilization of the paramilitary bands 
engaged in drug trafficking, 2008/09 
marked the beginning of an important 
decline after at least three years of steady 
increases in total production. To sustain 
this decline will require that Colombia 
continue its manual eradication efforts 
and that it provide additional funds for 
well-designed and executed alternative 
development programs in coca growing 
areas throughout the country. 
Meanwhile, increases in coca cultivation 
in both Peru and Bolivia suggest that the 
focus of U.S. attention and resources 
on Colombia has led to the neglect of 
coca cultivation in those traditional coca-
growing countries in the central Andes. To 








forestall a recurrence of the balloon effect 
pushing cultivation out of one country 
only to have it reappear in others, the 
Obama administration will have to seek 
to reestablish a workable relation with the 
government of President Evo Morales in 
Bolivia and find effective ways to combat 
the resurgence of Sendero Luminoso and 
coca cultivation in Alan Garcia’s Peru. 
Failure to do either will simply shift coca 
production once again back to Peru and 
Bolivia, thereby nullifying any real progress 
made in reducing coca cultivation in 
Colombia over the medium term.
In the 1980s, largely as a result of the 
formation of the U.S. government’s South 
Florida Task Force in 1982—headed by 
then-vice president G. H. W. Bush—the 
established Caribbean routes used by the 
Medellín and Cali cartels were essentially 
closed down by American law enforcement 
and military operations. They were quickly 
replaced in the 1980s and early 1990s 
with new routes that used Panama and 
Central America, the Gulf of Mexico, and 
the Pacific Corridor to reach Mexico and 
then cross from Mexico into the United 
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more, the War on drugs 
ConduCted By the united 
states and its Various latin 
ameriCan and CariBBean 
allies has suCCeeded 
repeatedly in shifting 
CoCa CultiVation from 
one area to another in 
the andes and in forCing 
frequent Changes in 
smuggling routes�”
(3) World Drug Report, 2010, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, p. 66
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States. When the Mexican cartels took over 
from Medellín and Cali in the late 1990s, 
the Pacific Corridor became the principal 
smuggling route northwards from Colombia 
to the United States, although the Gulf 
route also remained active. 
Since December 1, 2006, Mexican 
President Felipe Calderón, with 
Washington’s active assistance since 2008 
via the Merida Initiative, has waged an 
intense military campaign against Mexico’s 
major drug cartels. Although not by any 
means successful in eliminating Mexico’s 
key drug trafficking groups as of 2010, 
Calderón’s militarization of the drug war 
has unquestionably made smuggling across 
the U.S.-Mexican border from Mexico more 
dangerous and expensive than in past 
years. As a result, some of the Mexican 
trafficking organizations have begun to 
move into Central America—especially 
Guatemala and Honduras—to take 
advantage of these much weaker states to 
conduct their smuggling operations.
There is also abundant evidence 
available indicating increased use of both 
Venezuelan and Ecuadorian territory 
by Colombian traffickers to replace the 
increasingly problematic Mexico routes. 
Venezuela is a jumping-off point for 
smuggling through the Caribbean to the 
east coast of the United States or across 
the Atlantic through West Africa into 
Europe. Venezuela also is used for drug 
flights into Honduras or Guatemala where 
the shipments are then transferred to 
trucks and transported by land across the 
Guatemalan-Mexican border northwards to 
the United States.   
The balloon effects produced by the partial 
victories in the war on drugs on both drug 
cultivation and drug smuggling routes 
are self-evident. Over the past 25 years 
and more, the war on drugs conducted 
by the United States and its various 
Latin American and Caribbean allies has 
succeeded repeatedly in shifting coca 
cultivation from one area to another in 
the Andes and in forcing frequent changes 
in smuggling routes. But it has proven 
unable to disrupt seriously, much less 
stop permanently, either production or 
trafficking in the hemisphere. Worst of 
all, the traffickers’ constant, successful 
adaptations to law enforcement measures 
designed to end their activities have led to 
the progressive contamination of more and 
more countries in the region by the drug 
trade and its attendant criminality and 
violence.
  dispersion and fragmentations 
  of Criminal drug trafficking
  organizations 
The differential insertion of individual 
countries into the political economy of 
drug trafficking in the hemisphere has 
produced a variety of forms or types of 
intermediation between peasant growers 
of illicit crops and consumers. In Bolivia, 
the presence of peasant cooperatives 
in the countryside since the Nationalist 
Revolutionary Movement of 1952 produced 
coca grower associations and generally 
inhibited the rise of either criminal 
organizations or guerrilla movements 
as intermediaries, although the Bolivian 
military itself has on various occasions 
fulfilled this role. In Peru, the absence of 
strong grass roots associations among 
peasant growers opened the way for 
both elements of the country’s military 
apparatus (Vladimiro Montesinos) and 








to perform the role of intermediaries or 
traffickers. In Colombia, the absence of 
both peasant organizations and military 
intermediaries paved the way for the rise 
of major criminal organizations such as the 
Medellín and Cali cartels to fill the role. The 
demise of the major cartels opened the 
way for illegal armed actors such as the 
FARC and the paramilitaries. In Mexico and 
Central America, elements of the military 
and/or police have sometimes performed 
the functions of intermediation in previous 
decades, but in the 1990s and 2000s these 
countries have followed the Colombian 
pattern of criminal intermediation owing to 
the absence of strong grower associations.
In terms of criminal organizations or 
criminal trafficking networks, Colombia and 
Mexico provide the two most important 
examples over the last 25 years. In 
Colombia, the rise and fall of Medellín 
and Cali (and subsequently the Norte del 
Valle cartel) vividly illustrate the perils and 
vulnerabilities of large, hierarchical criminal 
trafficking organizations, especially when 
they attempt to confront the state openly. 
Both major cartels in Colombia were 
hierarchically structured and proved to 
be vulnerable targets for Colombian and 
international law enforcement agencies. 
In the wake of Medellín and Cali, Colombia 
witnessed a rapid fragmentation and 
dispersion of criminal networks that 
have proven far more difficult for law 
enforcement authorities to track down 
and dismantle than their larger and more 
notorious predecessors. Although there 
may be counter-tendencies leading to 
reconcentration among criminal trafficking 
organizations in Colombia today (e.g., los 
Rastrojos, las Aguilas Negras ), the basic 
lesson to emerge from Colombia appears 
to be that smaller criminal networks are 
less vulnerable. From the Colombian 
state’s perspective, such organizations are 
less threatening because they do not have 
the capacity to threaten state security 
directly.
In Mexico, as in Colombia in the 1980s 
and early 1990s, cocaine profits appear 
to have energized the country’s major 
criminal networks and unleashed a wave 
of violence among criminal organizations 
that are continuing to try to strengthen 
and consolidate their control of key 
smuggling routes. Nonetheless, Mexico’s 
criminal trafficking groups do appear to be 
slowly following the Colombian pattern of 
dispersion and fragmentation, although the 
evidence is not yet conclusive. In 2000, 
the Tijuana cartel (Arrellano Felix family) 
and the Juárez cartel (Carrillo Fuentes 
family) were the two largest and most 
dominant drug trafficking organizations 
in Mexico. Since 2000, after the Vicente 
Fox administration first went after Tijuana 
and then Juárez, Mexico has seen the 
rise of at least five new major trafficking 
organizations and a host of smaller, lesser 
known groups: Sinaloa, Gulf, Familia 
Michoacana, Beltran-Leyva, and Zetas. 
This dispersion of criminal networks in 
Mexico may well represent the beginning 
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of the kind of fragmentation observed in 
Colombia in the 1990s. If it does, the trend 
would be warmly welcomed by Mexican 
governing authorities because it would 
portend a considerable diminution in the 
capacity of organized criminal networks in 
Mexico to directly challenge state authority 
and national security.
A key reason why some analysts do 
not accept the fragmentation thesis in 
contemporary Mexico relates directly to 
the emergence of a new criminal network 
model— the Sinaloa cartel. Unlike its 
predecessors and current rivals in Mexico, 
the Sinaloa cartel is less hierarchical 
and more federative in its organizational 
structure. Its principal leader, Joaquín “El 
Chapo” Guzmán has forged a new type of 
“federation” that gives greater autonomy 
(and profits) to affiliated groups. To date, 
Sinaloa, also known as the Federation, 
seems to be winning the war against its 
rivals, although its fight against the Zetas 
(a paramilitary organization) is proving 
to be prolonged, costly, and bloody. It 
is conceivable that the Sinaloa model 
will prove more enduring—better for 
business—than other criminal trafficker 
organizational models in Mexico, but the 
jury is still out.
Under pressure from Mexican and U.S. 
law enforcement, Mexican trafficker 
organizations have, since the mid-
2000s if not before, sought to move at 
least part of their smuggling operations 
from Mexico into neighboring countries. 
Guatemala and Honduras are currently 
targets for both Sinaloa and the Zetas. 
The upsurge in drug-related violence in 
both of these Central American nations is 
closely related to these shifts in operational 
bases. This trend, observable throughout 
the hemisphere, is sometimes labeled 
the “cockroach” effect, because it is 
reminiscent of the scurrying of cockroaches 
out of a dirty kitchen into other places 
to avoid detection after a light has been 
turned on them. Closely linked to the 
“balloon” effect, the “cockroach” effect 
refers specifically to the displacement of 
criminal networks from one city/state/
region to another within a given country, 
or from one country to another in search 
of safer havens and more pliable state 
authorities.
  failure of political reform 
  or state Building 
States determine the form or type of 
organized crime that can operate and 
flourish within a given national territory. 
Criminal organizations do not determine 
the type of state, although they certainly 
can deter or inhibit political reform 
efforts at all levels of a political system. 
Advanced capitalist democracies— from 
the United States to Europe to Japan—
exhibit wide variations in the types of 
organized crime that they generate 
and/or tolerate. The United States, for 
example, has eliminated the Italian 
mafia model and seen it replaced by 
fragmented and widely dispersed domestic 
criminal organizations, many affiliated 
with immigrant communities. Europe is 
characterized by a similar evolution of 
organized crime groups affiliated with 
immigrant populations. Japan, in contrast, 
has coexisted with the Yakuza, a more 
corporate style criminal network. In China, 
state capitalism coexists with the Chinese 
triads. In Russia, the Putin government, 
in effect, subordinated and incorporated 









In Colombia, the paramilitary 
organizations, deeply involved in drug 
trafficking, were linked directly to both 
state institutions and to specific political 
parties. In Mexico, the formerly dominant 
PRI party developed almost tributary 
relations with organized crime groups. 
When the PRI’s almost 71–year monopoly 
over political power was broken at the 
national level in 2000 by the victory of PAN 
presidential candidate Vicente Fox, the old 
lines of tribute/bribery broke down as well. 
The political change unleashed a wave 
of internecine violence among trafficking 
organizations as they struggled among 
themselves for control of cocaine transit 
through their country.
Transitions from authoritarian regimes 
to more open and democratic forms of 
governance in Latin America, as in Russia 
and Eastern Europe, are particularly 
problematic, because the old, authoritarian 
institutional controls collapse or are swept 
away but cannot be easily or quickly 
replaced by new, democratic forms of 
control, at least in the short term. Mexico 
is experiencing precisely such a transition. 
The old institutions—e.g., police, courts, 
prisons, intelligence agencies, parties and 
elections—no longer work.  Indeed, they 
are patently dysfunctional.  Nevertheless, 
no new institutional mechanisms have 
arisen to replace them. Moreover, reform 
efforts can be, and often are, stymied or 
derailed entirely by institutional corruption 
and criminal violence intended to limit or 
undermine state authority and the rule of 
law.
Such observations do not constitute 
arguments against democratization. Rather 
they highlight challenges and obstacles 
along the road to democratization that 
are frequently overlooked or ignored 
altogether. Few democratic theorists 
have seriously examined the problems 
for democratic transitions that emanate 
from organized and entrenched criminal 
networks. In the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean, such neglect 
may well imperil political stability and 
democracy itself. Rather than democratic 
consolidation, the consequence of 
ignoring organized crime and its corrosive 
effects may well be institutional decay or 
democratic de-institutionalization.
  the inflexibility and ineffectiveness 
  of regional and international drug 
  Control policies (regulatory failures)
Reflecting the hegemonic influence of 
the United States over international 
drug policy during the post–World War II 
period, the United Nations Organization 
of Drug and Crime Control (UNODC) and 
the Organization of American States’ 
Inter-American Drug Abuse Control 
Commission (OAS-CICAD) have both 
faithfully reproduced the U.S. prohibitionist 
regime at the multilateral level. The UN’s 
approach to drug control (like that of 
the OAS) severely limits the flexibility of 
responses at the level of member-states 
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because it effectively rules out any possible 
experimentation with legalization and/
or decriminalization. Both the UN and 
the OAS part from the assumption that 
all illicit drugs are “evil” and must be 
prohibited and suppressed. In practice, the 
unwavering prohibitionist strategy pursed 
by the UN, OAS, and the United States has 
dominated international discourse on drug 
control and prevented individual countries 
from experimenting with alternative 
approaches (or forced them to ignore or 
defy their UN treaty obligations regarding 
narcotics control). 
For example, the UN, OAS, and the United 
States have, in effect, systematically 
rejected Bolivian President Evo Morales’ 
declared policy of fostering traditional and 
commercial uses of legally grown coca leaf 
while preventing the processing of coca 
leaf into cocaine in that country. Similarly, 
both the U.S. federal government and 
the UN condemned the November 2010 
California ballot initiative that sought (and 
failed) to legalize marijuana cultivation 
and commercialization in that state. It 
is entirely possible that, had California’s 
Proposition 19 initiative on marijuana 
been approved by the state’s voters, it 
would have run afoul of both the United 
States’ federal statutes and its UN treaty 
obligations.
In practice, the UN prohibitionist inclination 
has meant that there is no international 
backing for options other than the current 
“War on Drugs,” no matter what collateral 
damage is incurred in the process. 
The 10-year UN (UNGASS) review of 
international drug control policies (1998-
2008) predictably concluded that the 
prohibitionist UN policies currently in place 
were the best and only real strategic option 
available moving forward and generated 
no significant alterations in international 
drug control policies and practices, 
despite evident and growing inconformity 
among some member states and many 
independent analysts. 
  the failure of u.s. 
  drug Control policies
While the United States has managed to 
stabilize demand for most illicit drugs at 
home, it most certainly has not eliminated 
American demand for illicit drugs or the 
profits associated with supplying the huge 
U.S. market. Demand control has routinely 
been underfunded by Washington while 
primary emphasis has almost automatically 
been accorded to expensive, but ultimately 
ineffective, supply-side control strategies. 
Analysis of the reasons behind the U.S. 
insistence on supply over demand control 
strategies lies beyond the scope of this 
essay. 
The consequences of Washington’s 
strategic choices are, however, obvious. 
Washington has demanded that the 
countries of the region follow its lead in 
the war on drugs and has often sanctioned 
those nations that do not “fully cooperate.” 
U.S. insistence on such a policy approach 
has not only led to overall failure in the 
war on drugs over the last 25 years, it has 
been counterproductive for both U.S. and 
individual Latin American country interests. 
The price that Colombia has paid for its 
role in the war on drugs has been high in 
both blood and treasure. The price that 
Mexico is being asked to pay today is as 
high or higher. The high costs associated 
with failure have generated a reaction 
to the U.S. strategy both at home and 








alternatives to American prohibitionist 
approaches such as harm reduction, 
decriminalization, and legalization. 
  the search for Alternatives: 
  the debate over Legalization
Some Latin American analysts had 
anticipated that passage of California’s 
Proposition 19 in 2010, which would have 
legalized the cultivation, distribution, and 
possession of marijuana in the state, would 
have signaled the beginning of the end of 
the U.S.-led war on drugs and allow Mexico 
and other countries in the region to move 
away from the “prohibitionist” strategy 
that has generated so much drug-related 
violence throughout Latin America and 
the Caribbean in recent years. Many Latin 
American political leaders, however, openly 
oppose the legalization of marijuana and 
stridently argue against the legalization or 
decriminalization of harder drugs. 
Whether one was for or against Proposition 
19, there were sound reasons to be 
skeptical of the real impact of marijuana 
legalization in California. First, even if the 
initiative had passed, there were likely to 
be U.S. federal government challenges 
that could delay implementation of the 
new law for years. Second, legalization of 
marijuana, if and when it occurs, will not 
address the issues—production, trafficking, 
and distribution— raised by harder drugs. 
Criminal gangs in Mexico and elsewhere in 
the region will most likely move away from 
marijuana to deeper involvement in the 
still-illegal drugs such as cocaine, heroin, 
and methamphetamines; organized crime 
will continue to flourish; and drug-related 
violence will continue unabated. In the long 
run, legalization or decriminalization of  
illicit drugs offer the only real solutions to 
drug-related crime and violence in Mexico 
and around the globe, even if addiction 
rates go up as they did with the end of  
U.S. alcohol prohibition. But in the short 
-and medium-run, Latin American countries 
will have to address their own seriously 
flawed institutions. Ending long-standing 
corrupt practices, undertaking police, 
judicial, prison and other key institutional 
reforms, and ensuring greater electoral 
accountability are changes that cannot 
wait for legalization to take place at some 
nebulous point in the future. Legalization 
of marijuana is no panacea. It will not 
eliminate the many other types of organized 
crime that operate with virtual impunity in 
Latin America and the Caribbean today.
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Few topics have received as much 
systematic, prominent attention in the 
last 20–30 years as drug trafficking. 
But at the same time, few issues have 
managed to remain so poorly understood 
as the phenomenon of illegal drugs, not 
only by the general public, but often 
by the journalists who cover it. This 
disconnect occurs because news coverage 
of drug trafficking is dominated by a 
series of paradoxes that have profound 
repercussions on the quality of the public 
debate about drugs, drug traffickers, and 
the pursuers of both.
Organized crime—especially in its most 
modern, sophisticated, and violent form—
the trafficking of drugs—is perhaps the 
greatest threat confronting journalism 
in the Americas. Of all the threats in the 
continent to the freedom, creativity, and 
ability of journalists to practice their trade, 
drug traffickers—“narcos”—are the most 
systematic, far-reaching, and lethal. In a 
context of serious threats and escalating 
violence, the news coverage of drugs, 
which focuses almost exclusively on what 
is popularly called “narco-trafficking,” is 
also surrounded by strange paradoxes.
The drug phenomenon can only be 
understood from a global perspective, but 
it is typically covered as an exclusively 
local issue. The news focuses on one 
element, the traffickers and their 
trafficking, but not on the system that 
they form, including drugs and their 
prohibition. Drug coverage focuses on 
a singular policy, the so-called “war on 
drugs,” and not on the diverse policies 
nor the rich, intense debate surrounding 
them. “Narco-trafficking,” the term that 
has popularized the activity of drug 
trafficking, is a social, economic, political, 
and cultural phenomenon, besides being 
a criminal one, but it is covered mainly 
as a police story. Clichés prevail in the 
news coverage and in the public debate 
about these highly complex topics. And 
what is most notorious about the broad 
academic research about drugs is its great 
disconnect with the worlds of journalism 
and policy. The result is a public debate 
that hardly reflects the broad knowledge 
acquired about illegal drugs and the 
is theRe An indePendent  
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of journalism, drug traffickers—“narcos”—represent the most systematic, 
far-reaching and lethal threat. however, the news coverage, which focuses 
almost exclusively on what is popularly called “narco-trafficking,” is 
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complex systems that facilitate their 
production, trafficking, and consumption. 
Drug coverage lacks a critical and informed 
vision about the policies that have been 
employed for 100 years to combat drugs.
The information, of course, is not uniform 
and it would be arbitrary to label it as such. 
The quality and focuses of information 
vary greatly from country to country, 
region to region—due to intimidation by 
regimes of totalitarian terror imposed by 
criminal organizations. Freedom of the 
press is almost always the primary victim. 
Journalists write in-depth stories, and they 
do high-quality analyses and investigations 
and obtain remarkable interviews and 
data. But the information published on a 
day-to-day basis and its wide consumption 
by the public reflect those paradoxes. The 
strength or weakness of the journalistic 
work has profound repercussions not only 
for the content, but also for the vigor and 
depth of the public debate around illegal 
drugs and, in turn, the decisions that 
politicians make about these issues. 
  the global phenomenon of drugs
Drug trafficking is a global phenomenon. 
To assume differently makes it impossible 
to understand and explain. Furthermore, 
it is a clandestine business for which the 
available data is, at best, tentative. The 
United Nations’ Office on Drugs and Crime 
and its annual World Drug Report provide 
the most widely disseminated information, 
but the data are still estimates.
If we look at the World Drug Report’s 
annual map of drug consumption, 
production, and trafficking1, we see that 
Mexico, Colombia, and other nations are 
mere pieces in a vast international drug 
network. There is no country on earth 
that does not have demand for some 
of the illegal substances that fall under 
the categories of narcotics, hypnotics, 
stimulants, intoxicants or hallucinogens2. 
The tentacles of illegal supply extend 
throughout the planet, with production 
nodes for certain drugs concentrated 
in specific regions (cocaine in the 
Andes, heroin in Afghanistan), and the 
cultivation or fabrication of other drugs are 
disseminated across dozens of countries (in 
the case of marijuana and amphetamines). 
The business in the last 100 years has 
shown a capacity for adaptation and agility 
that any naturalist would envy: how the 
mode of consumption evolves from one 
to another, from country to country; and 
the rhythm in which repressive campaigns 
against drugs concentrate in one region 
or country give lift to new routes, new 
markets, and new players. What happens 
in one country cannot be understood 
without knowing what is happening in the 
others. 
Almost all the data on the business is 
modest: the consumers of drugs—the 
customers—range between 155 million 
and 250 million people (less than 6 
percent of the world population between 
the ages of 15-64, for the highest figure), 
according to estimates from the UN Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The UNODC 
estimates “problematic users” (addicts) as 
between 16 million to 38 million people. 
The fields sown for drug cultivation are 
small compared to other crops, and with 
the exception of marijuana they are 
concentrated in a handful of countries: 
three Andean nations account for 158,800 
hectares of coca cultivation; Afghanistan 
holds most of the world’s 180,000 hectares 
of poppy fields; and 200,000–600,000 
(1) UNODC, World Drug Report 2010.









hectares of cannabis are planted around 
the world in open air, and increasingly 
indoors. The volume of the market is also 
impressive. Production for 2008 included 
865 tons of cocaine, 7,700 tons of opium 
(650 tons of heroin), between 161 and 
588 tons of amphetamines (demonstrating 
the uncertain range of the estimates), 
and 55–133 tons of ecstasy. Production 
of cannabis is estimated to total between 
13,000 and 66,000 tons3. Compared to oil 
production—which rose to 3.82 billion tons 
in 20094—and viewed in purely numeric 
terms, it also seems incredible that the 
violence in Mexico and Central America 
could be generated by the transit of no 
more than 140 tons of cocaine5. 
The business itself, on the other hand, is 
the largest illegal industry in the world. 
With revenue for cocaine estimated at $88 
billion, and heroin estimated at $55 billion, 
the total value of either of these two drugs 
is several times larger than any other illicit 
enterprise in the world, and bigger than a 
number of legitimate businesses as well. 
Estimates on the trafficking of natural 
products or human trafficking are nine 
times smaller than cocaine. If the UNODC 
correctly valued the global business of 
drugs between 2003 and 2005 at $320 
billion, only 27 countries would have a GDP 
greater than this sum6. (Since then, the 
estimates have dropped significantly.)
 
The drug trade is highly efficient. It has 
systematically evaded every control put in 
its path. The consumer prices today are a 
fraction of what they were 25 years ago, 
despite the fact that the main market for 
drugs, the United States, has shrunk by 
half. Between 1982 and 2003, the price 
of cocaine dropped from $700 to just 
over $100 per gram in the United States. 
Heroin prices fell similarly, a decrease that 
has not been offset by the rising price 
of cocaine from 2006–2007. The drop 
occurred despite the fact that the number 
of U.S. users of cocaine fell from 10.5 
million to 5.3 million between 1982 and 
2008. It should be noted though, that new 
markets opened in Western Europe and 
South America during this time. Regarding 
cocaine, Mexican drug organizations are, 
in fact, fighting among themselves for a 
shrinking market north of the border.  
 
In what other industry can you acquire 
primary material (coca leaf at a farm in 
Colombia, necessary to process a kilo of 
pure cocaine) at $650 per kilo, ship the 
processed good (usually on a fast boat 
from some cove in the Pacific) at $1,200 
to $1,500 per kilo, and then see the price 
shoot up to $15,000 at the U.S.-Mexican 
border, and finally sell for $100,000 to 
$120,000 at retail prices in U.S. cities? 
The business exhibits extraordinary 
adaptability and resilience. The case of 
cocaine is significant. Billions of dollars 
invested in the “war on drugs” have 
brought about the reduction of 50,000 
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(3) All data are taken from UNODC.
(4) British Petroleum, Statistical Review of World Energy, 2010, http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9023
758&contentId=7044107
(5) This is the amount that the UNODC estimates to circulate in the region from Colombia to the United States. (Of course, 
there are other drugs and crimes, especially in Mexico.) Op. Cit.









hectares of coca cultivation in the Andes in 
the last 20 years. (It would be interesting 
to calculate how much this reduction has 
cost since the eradication started in Peru.) 
In the same period, seizures of cocaine 
have multiplied two and a half times. 
According to the UNODC, there were 
100 fewer tons of cocaine available for 
consumption in 2008 than the almost 600 
in 1990. In adjusted U.S. dollars, the U.S. 
market has decreased one quarter between 
1988 and 2008. Despite this, more 
cocaine is produced today (865 tons in 
2008, versus 774 in 1990), more cheaply, 
and is available in three times as many 
markets as it was 20 years ago. Opiates 
experienced something similar: in 2008, 
opium production (7,700 tons) was almost 
double that of 1990, and heroin rose from 
562 tons in 1994 to 735 tons in 2008. So, 
despite the best efforts of governments, 
the decrease in cultivation and the increase 
in seizures have done little to affect what 
matters most—production. As a result, the 
production of drugs today is as prosperous 
if not more so than it was in the past. 
This is the great paradox of the global 
antidrug strategy in force for the 
last several decades and has been 
commonplace for experts for years. 
Nevertheless, this paradox has only just 
started to take a more prominent place 
in the media and in the public debate on 
drugs.
How do you explain that a business whose 
principal market has been drastically 
reduced and whose prices have dropped 
for two decades can continue to produce—
and sell—prosperously, and maintain profit 
margins that would be the envy of the 
most venturesome financial speculator? 
This is but one of the many great questions 
that journalists have barely explored, 
yet it gets at the heart of paradoxes that 
characterize the news coverage of illegal 
drugs.   
  global phenomenon, local coverage
Drugs and their trafficking are a global 
phenomenon. However, its coverage by 
journalists is conspicuously local.
The production, trafficking, and 
consumption of narcotics, the quasi-
religious restrictions against them for over 
a century, (in Shanghai, in 1909, a handful 
of countries, with a North American 
Anglican bishop at the helm, decided to 
prohibit them), and the colossal industry 
built around them are all global. Drug 
trafficking cannot be understood without 
assuming as much, but the journalistic 
coverage of the topic is predominantly 
national. At best, there are bursts of 
international connections in the news: the 
descent of the Mexican Zetas into Central 
America; cocaine in Peru or the “paco” 
(crack) business in Argentina tied to a 
Mexican group; the Colombian connection 
in Guinea-Bissau. However, the flash of 
the local drug stories that make the front 
pages outshines those that focus on the 
global essence of the drug trade.
The global story of drugs is very old, 
but their prohibition and the resulting 
phenomenon of drug trafficking are 
very recent. The taste for “artificial 
paradises” and their consumption is as 
old as humanity itself. (There is evidence 
of medicinal and recreational use of 
opiates dating back to the Neolithic era.) 
While they have been the targets of local 
prohibitions in some instances in history 








example), it was only in the 20th century 
that drugs were declared illegal and their 
production, distribution, and consumption 
criminalized on an international scale. The 
disastrous attempt by the United States to 
prohibit alcohol from 1920 to 1933 set off 
the criminalization. And, like Al Capone, 
the trafficking of alcohol was the first child 
of prohibition. The English, the modern 
era’s first drug traffickers, with their 
“opium clippers” (the “fast boats” of the 
19th century) imposed opium consumption 
on the Chinese by means of two wars. 
While prohibition seems natural today, it 
has only been the established order for a 
brief period of time. It began 100 years 
ago and was only fully formalized between 
1961 and 1988 with the three United 
Nations conventions on drugs and the 
institutions charged with overseeing their 
enforcement7. 
The geography of drugs and the 
nationalities of the traffickers are as global 
as their history, peppered with celebrities: 
Al Capone and “Lucky” Luciano in the 
United States, Pablo Escobar in Colombia, 
Joaquin “el Chapo” Guzmán in Mexico. 
Trends in consumption come and go in 
waves. Coca was exported legally from 
Peru to the United States, and Bayer, 
the fledgling German multinational, had 
it planted in Java until the beginning of 
the 20th century. African American dock 
workers first started using cocaine in the 
United States until it saw a resurgence 
of popularity, this time as a fashionable 
drug with white, middle-class Wall 
Street workers. In the 1980s cocaine 
reinvented itself yet again, this time 
as crack, infesting marginalized, black 
neighborhoods. The taste for opium, long 
attributed to the Chinese due to racist 
stereotypes in the United States and 
Mexico during the 1920s and 1930s, grew 
into the heroin epidemic of the late 1960s 
and early 1970s in the United States. 
Today, chronic heroin consumption plagues 
nations like Russia. Opium has been 
trafficked by the “gomeros” of Sinaloa, 
armed groups in the Golden Triangle, 
and warlords in Afghanistan, amongst 
others. Long before the Colombians, 
Chileans controlled cocaine trafficking 
until the Pinochet dictatorship, as did 
Cubans. Mexicans are the Americas’ oldest 
smugglers, and in addition to Colombian 
cocaine, they provide the United States 
with marijuana (some estimate that this is 
their single biggest business) and locally 
produced heroin. The smuggling of opium 
from Mexico into the United States grew 
under the protection of the single party 
since the 1920s. Marijuana was also 
smuggled in large amounts until the Nixon 
Administration’s “Operation Intercept” in 
1969 and the Mexican Army’s “Operation 
Condor” in the 1970s displaced part of 
the cultivation and business to Colombia. 
There, air fumigation of the marijuana 
plantations in the late 1970s moved the 
cultivation into the United States. Today, it 
is the United States’ most profitable crop, 
estimated at $35 billion annually, and it 
competes with cheaper varieties from 
“almost all the data  
on the Business is modest: 
the Consumers of  
drugs, the fields soWn  
for drug CultiVation,  
the produCtion… the 
Business itself, on the 
other hand, is the largest 
illegal industry in the 
World�”
(7) The three conventions are the Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961), the Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1972), 
and the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic  Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988). The three 
are governed by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the International Narcotics Control Board, and the United Nations 








Mexico and potent strains from hydroponic 
indoor cultures in Canada. Five years 
ago, West Africa did not figure into the 
global map of illicit drugs; today, it is a 
key route for Colombian cocaine to enter 
Europe. Much to its dismay and against 
all predictions until very recently, Costa 
Rica was included by the United States 
on its “dark list” of 20 leading countries 
for the production or transit of drugs in 
September 2010, as described by the 
Costa Rican daily La Nación. This was a 
result of Caribbean routes being displaced 
and moving into Central America.
Global geography, changing tastes 
in consumption and shifting national 
protagonists hardly enter the public debate 
on drugs, widely fed by local televised 
incidents of the “war on drugs.” The 
“war” is in itself another global element, 
although the media and the politicians 
have attempted in vain to draw its results 
on a local scale for over 40 years.  In the 
feature film of drugs, where mobility and 
adaptation are the stars, the public only 
sees the photographs of the supporting 
actors. Although a few, like “Chapo” 
Guzmán and Pablo Escobar for example, 
may be important just like their individual 
countries, they are but a few portraits in 
the gallery of illegal drugs. 
 
Media in the continent speak little about 
the regional geography of drugs and 
rarely recognize that the Americas are 
the epicenter of the global drug trade. 
They are a center for drug production: 
Mexico, Paraguay, the United States, and 
Canada are among the main producers 
of marijuana; the Andean region is the 
world’s only producer of cocaine; Mexico 
and Colombia produce heroin; and several 
countries manufacture amphetamines and 
ecstasy. For all they produce, the Americas 
are also centers for drug consumption with 
close to a quarter of the world’s marijuana 
users, more than 10 percent of opium 
users, almost half the cocaine users, and 
around 8 million users of ecstasy and 
amphetamines. Following the trend of 
production and consumption, the Americas 
are also a center for drug trafficking. 
This, what should be a base element of 
journalism’s context for drug coverage, is 
often reduced, when it appears at all, to 
a few lines in reports about Mexico and 
the 28,000 who have died during Felipe 
Calderón’s administration.  
The lack of mutual coverage among 
countries in the Americas is stunning. 
Mexico is in the news often, but there are 
few investigations on drug trafficking’s 
international connections, comparisons 
between countries, or reports on the 
nations that are becoming increasingly 
important in the international drug trade, 
like Argentina, Brazil, Haiti, Jamaica, 
Venezuela, and countries in Central 
America. Media in each country report the 
problem as local and infrequently, and with 
hardly any depth or rigor about what is 
going on in the neighborhood.    
Nor is there a serious debate about the 
statistics and the methodologies used to 
obtain data. The media ritually covers 
the UNODC reports for their countries, 
but a critical eye is rarely cast upon these 
statistics which are just estimates that are 
viewed skeptically by many experts. Few 
journalists utilize the statistics to create 
comparative regional portraits, analyze 
trends, or make forecasts, all of which 
would contribute to a more nuanced public 
debate on drugs. The numbers on the 
business dimensions of the global or local 
drug trade and the supposed fortunes 








critical reflection. The information is not 
compared to data from skeptical experts, 
and audiences are not warned about its 
precarious nature. For example, between 
2003 and 2005, the UNODC said the global 
market for drugs was $320 billion; in 
2009 its director, Antonio Maria Costa, put 
the cocaine trade at $50 billion. Another 
study the following year estimated it at 
$88 billion while yet another group led by 
the U.S. expert Peter Reuter estimated 
the cocaine trade at between $8 billion 
and $12 billion8. After calculating a fixed 
number for ecstasy users for several 
years, the UNODC has opted to express 
its findings in ranges since 2009. For 
example, the ODC estimates there are 
between 13.7 million and 52.9 million 
amphetamine users in the world9. With 
such data, any journalist should exercise 
the utmost caution. Like Winston Churchill 
said about the Kremlin, to estimate 
information about a clandestine business 
through seizures, arrests, and consumption 
surveys is like predicting the outcome of a 
dog fight taking place under a rug.  
Journalism’s continued local perspective of 
a phenomenon that can only be explained 
on a global and regional scale is, perhaps, 
what most confounds an adequate 
comprehension of drug trafficking.  
  Covering drug trafficking, 
  or covering drugs?
Journalism tends to focus on one single 
element (drug trafficking and traffickers) 
while only marginally referring to the wider 
system in which these elements exist 
(drugs in general and their prohibition). 
Generally speaking, the information deals 
with a piece, not with the set.
The more notorious part of the 
phenomenon is what gets the most 
coverage. Obviously, an extraordinary 
explosion of violence like what has 
occurred in Mexico over the last few years 
or the kind that characterizes Colombian 
traffickers commands a place of privilege 
in the media. It is not only because the 
rules of journalism reserve a distinguished 
place for extraordinary or violent acts, but 
rather because it deals with a topic of the 
greatest importance for societies that are 
then forced to contemplate, shocked, how 
a whirlpool of ever more degraded violence 
increasingly overtakes daily life. Part of 
journalism’s core function is to address 
these types of situations with special 
interest, and society avidly seeks whatever 
information it can find to throw light on the 
subject.     
The public and journalists enter into 
a fatal attraction with the romance of 
drug trafficking, its characters, and the 
trappings of their extravagance. Few topics 
make as “sexy” headlines as glimpses into 
the lives of criminal characters shrouded in 
secrets and legends. Only a little becomes 
known, but it points to huge resources, 
ways of spending money, and modalities 
of crime, corruption and violence, which 
need no headline to be sensational. It 
is understandable that notoriety in the 
media is guaranteed to the stories about 
“in the feature film of 
drugs, Where moBility 
and adaptation are the 
stars, the puBliC only sees 
the photographs of the 
supporting aCtors�”
(8)  See declarations by Antonio Maria Costa, the news release about the World Drug Report 2009, and the report The 
Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment (2010), available at www.unodc.org.








characters like Tony Tormenta, the Mexican 
mob boss killed by the Mexican Army 
in November 2010; or to the Hello Kitty 
memorabilia belonging to the wife of Juan 
Carlos Abadía (“Chupeta”), discovered at 
their home during their arrest in São Paulo 
in August 2007. This is drug trafficking’s 
hypnotic spell to which, inevitably, the 
media and society succumb. 
Drug trafficking and its violence are 
the most visible part of the universe of 
illegal drugs. The problem is that these 
barely form the tip of the iceberg, and 
to concentrate only on them leads to 
“undesirable consequences,” to borrow 
the UNODC’s terminology regarding drug 
prohibition10. 
Like all events that fall into the category 
of “extraordinary,” the degraded violence 
associated with the drug trade captivates 
the attention of the media, which cover 
it as if it were an inevitable natural 
disaster like a hurricane or a tsunami. 
The devastation, the victims, and the 
catastrophe lead the news programs 
and the front pages. The context takes a 
back seat to the avalanche of destruction 
and death; repetition frequently replaces 
explanation. The news reports on 
assassinations, bombs, decapitations, 
massacres, and kidnappings, and their 
perpetrators and victims. Individual 
murders are so innumerable that they stop 
becoming news. Collective assassinations 
take their place, and once those become 
everyday occurrences, only the truly 
horrifying or those involving many deaths 
are deemed newsworthy. The front pages 
remain reserved for only the most savage 
or bizarre acts of violence in a race to 
capture audiences’ attention, while the 
gross quantity of faceless victims grows, 
replacing individual stories. As in a natural 
disaster, there are too many dead to do 
anything but count them, and the routine 
of violence installs itself in the headlines 
with the same force as it does over society. 
The result is curious. Valuable, deep, and 
brave stories are published, of course, 
with excellent investigation that goes 
beyond the daily coverage, but the flash 
points of violence generally prevail in the 
news. This is especially true for Mexico 
as of late, and Colombia before it, when 
the local and foreign news media almost 
exclusively cover violence. For example, in 
the first 10 months of 2010, 30 of the 44 
covers of the Mexican magazine Proceso 
were dedicated to drug violence and drug 
kingpins. (“Nacho” Coronel alone had three 
covers in one month.) In all likelihood, 
the total number of articles from the New 
York Times or the Los Angeles Times 
dedicated to the “war on drugs” would 
grab a similar proportion. The narrative of 
violence in the news is so prominent that 
the rest of the world has to sneak in the 
back door to get coverage. The days are 
filled with seized drug shipments; arrested 
or assassinated drug dealers; shootouts; 
atrocious executions; corrupt police and 
politicians; announcements of one drug 
network after another dismantled; all kinds 
of speculation about the drug cartels, 
their bosses and successors; and murder 
victims that accumulate in an anonymous 
pile. This is to be expected, given the rules 
of journalism, but in the short term the 
consequences are unusual. Despite daily 
reporting and big headlines, the depth of 
the coverage is inversely proportional to its 
quantity and prominence. What the public 
ends up learning about the drug trade is 
but the tip of the iceberg of a phenomenon 
whose complexity barely becomes 
mere brushstrokes in the vast mural of 
information. The topic of illegal drugs is 
(10)  Since the failures of the current strategy against drugs have become more evident, the UNODC has accepted that this 
has led to "unintended consequences," the most notable of which is "the emergence of a large and violent illicit drug 








reduced to the drug traffickers and dealers, 
essentially focusing on police efforts and 
the myths propagated by state offices. 
The topic of violence is concentrated into a 
handful of clichés repeated once and again 
until they become shared knowledge.
Covering drug trafficking is not covering 
drugs. Organized crime’s wars against and 
within the government, the corruption 
they create, and the mechanisms in 
which they pad the pockets of the 
authorities and impose themselves on 
local communities are but a few planets 
in the galaxy of drugs. But there are 
many other planets in this galaxy: the 
complex problem of drug use, the policies 
to address it and the current debate on 
the strategy, among other issues. To 
limit the coverage to drug traffickers 
and violence deprives the public of 
essential information to understand the 
phenomenon of drugs. (This, of course, is 
without addressing the limits of covering 
organized crime where access to sources 
is scarce and dangerous, and official 
versions and myths tend to dominate.)
Drug use in Latin America is a notable 
example of an important topic overlooked 
by the emphasis on drug traffickers. 
As repressive policies have displaced 
cocaine routes and demand for cocaine 
in the United States has diminished, 
rapid growth in cocaine use has not 
only taken place in Western Europe and 
Australia, but also in Latin America. 
With 2.7 million users, Latin America 
is now the third largest market in the 
world for cocaine and the most dynamic 
one. As Western Europe’s consumption 
has stabilized, Latin America’s is on the 
rise. Brazil, with close to a million users, 
and Argentina, which has the greatest 
rate of consumption in the world, are 
two particularly serious cases. Forms 
of crack, like “paco” are very popular in 
both countries. Historically, Latin America 
has not shown great rates of cocaine 
consumption, but this is changing rapidly. 
Research on the consumption of drugs 
in the region is weak. Coverage of drug 
consumption in the region is decidedly 
poor and rarely featured. When it is 
included in the news lineup it rarely has 
to do with trends in consumption or the 
big picture. The result? Even though 
consumption isn’t a major concern of the 
region’s governments or their publics, 
it should be one of the most important 
parts of the public debate. A silent rise in 
cocaine consumption has taken place in 
Mexico even as President Calderón’s “war 
on drugs” thunders from the front pages. 
Changes in the course of consumption, its 
deep repercussions for public health, the 
almost complete lack of educational and 
preventative public policies, the balance 
between national and international 
assistance and between security and 
prevention measures, and a long list of 
other topics not covered by the media are, 
as a result, absent from the public debate. 
“drug traffiCKing and 
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  Covering one policy (the “war 
  on drugs”) and not the rest
Two narratives have dominated the public 
debate on drugs in the Americas over 
the last several decades: prohibition 
and the “war on drugs.” These policies 
directly benefited from the media’s focus 
on the front-line strategy against the 
drug trade designed by the United States 
that has been, more or less, obediently 
implemented in every country in the 
region. Until recently, the media paid 
little attention to other policies against 
drugs or to the debate about them 
advancing in other parts of the world, 
and on the active changes in legislation 
happening both in Latin America and 
abroad.
This part of the world accepts as a 
natural phenomenon that a great many 
substances, due to various international 
conventions, are illegal. This illegality 
makes up the basic social assumptions 
of society, like poverty and inequality, 
when in reality it is only as “natural” as 
these other conditions. They come out of 
policy decisions, economic fluctuations, 
structural aspects of society, and other 
historical-social determinates. Prohibition 
is a very recent historical construction 
and has been the subject of analysis and 
criticism, which the journalism in Latin 
America reflects poorly. This is not to say, 
of course, that the media should mount a 
campaign against prohibition, but rather 
it should offer the public, as they do on 
other themes, the necessary context 
to understand and debate the general 
framework of the modern international 
treatment of the drug trade. In regards 
to discussion of prohibition, this context 
is almost completely absent from the 
coverage.
Furthermore, one of the effects of covering 
drug trafficking rather than drugs is that 
the information has concentrated on the 
most radical aspects of prohibition, the 
so-called “war against drugs.” Successive 
U.S. administrations have pushed this 
policy since President Richard Nixon 
declared the war in a 1971 speech, and 
President Ronald Reagan declared in 
the 1980s that drugs were a matter of 
national security. The result is a series of 
campaigns mounted from Washington on 
two basic principles: one, the flow of drugs 
into the United States can be contained by 
attacking the centers of production in the 
countries of cultivation and processing; 
and two, that drug use should be 
penalized. At the end of the 1970s, the war 
pursued marijuana in Mexico and later in 
Colombia. Afterwards, efforts focused on 
fighting the cultivation of coca in Peru and 
Bolivia in the 1980s. When coca moved to 
Colombia following this crackdown, Plan 
Colombia and the Andean Initiative were 
introduced at the end of the 1990s. Now 
that the axis of trafficking has moved to 
Mexico and Central America, Washington’s 
response was the Mérida Initiative. It is 
these campaigns and the adaptations of 
the traffickers that capture the attention 
of the media. Coverage abounds with drug 
seizures, hidden stashes with fantastic 
sums of money, the fall of kingpin after 
kingpin, and the supposed dismantling of 
drug networks. Extraditions of kingpins 
to the United States happen at the same 
pace as they are replaced and their 
organizations renamed. 
According to the Mexican academic Luis 
Astorga, this has left the field open to 
the official storyline. “The perception 
and characterization of drug trafficking, 
the traffickers, and the drug users in 








permeated by a uniform moral and law 
enforcement perspective that leaves little 
room for a plurality of foci. It does not 
maintain a critical, or at least a prudent, 
distance from the official discourse, as if 
it were the truth revealed, and it omits 
or ignores national and international 
academic studies on a subject they speak 
about daily.”11 
Concentrating the coverage on the 
traffic and traffickers, in fact, grants a 
disproportionate weight to the authorities, 
which are the only sources of easily 
accessible information and provide the 
dominant discourse. In this way official 
narratives influence the public perception 
of drugs, and largely reduce the topic to 
what policy should be used to combat 
drugs. As Astorga says, “Over the last 
several decades, the State has had a 
monopoly over the definition of drugs and 
drug trafficking. The academy, the media, 
the political opposition and civil society 
have not generated other discourses to 
compete with this. In other words, the 
trade and traffickers of drugs were exactly 
what the media said they were.”12
The lack of an independent narrative in the 
media about drugs is perhaps the most 
notable paradox in the news coverage of 
drugs. Not only has this absence facilitated 
the dominance of the official narrative, but 
also because in the face of the ever-growing 
disaster that is the “war on drugs” (which 
the media has started to acknowledge more 
openly in the last few years) the public 
debate on drug policy and its eventual 
alternatives demands a much more 
nuanced understanding than the black and 
white stories of “good cops” (or increasingly, 
corrupt ones) and romanticized bandits 
that have been told for decades. Does the 
public have all the information necessary 
to evaluate the policies against drugs 
and actively participate in a discussion on 
the development of a public policy that 
warrants the caliber and complexity of the 
problem? This is a question that editors and 
journalists should ask themselves as they 
reflect on the coverage they have produced 
over the years. 
The continent of the “war on drugs” rarely 
debates “harm reduction,” an alternative 
policy whose name profoundly bothers 
many in U.S. government policy circles. 
It has not only been key to addressing 
drug abuse in Western Europe but has 
also begun to be applied in Latin America. 
In essence, harm reduction aims to see 
the drug user as a patient rather than a 
criminal, a subject for the public health 
sector and not incarceration. Needle 
exchange programs for addicts to prevent 
the spread of HIV, clinics that offer heroin 
substitute injections like methadone, 
and the controlled legalization of some 
drugs for personal use in countries like 
Switzerland, Germany, Portugal, and 
other European nations have caught the 
attention of administrations in Brazil and 
China but not that of the media. 
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In the last few years, countries from 
Mexico to Argentina have started to 
introduce national legislation that little by 
little aims to decriminalize drugs for use 
on a personal level. (Colombian president 
Alvaro Uribe, on the other hand, was the 
only one to criminalize drugs for personal 
use in 2010.) The Transnational Institute, 
led by Martin Helsma, keeps track of such 
changes in legislation.13 Even though media 
report, obviously, on the local legislative 
modifications and the debate around them, 
there is a scarcity of comparative reports 
and analyses of regional trends and the 
context in which these reforms take place. 
The assumption that drug prohibition and 
its legitimate daughter, the “war on drugs,” 
are natural policies leaves little room in the 
headlines for alternative approaches.
In September 2010, Russia assumed for 
the first time the leadership of a large UN 
agency when Yuri Fedotov, a diplomatic 
holdover from the Soviet era, replaced 
Antonio Maria Costa as the leader of the 
UNODC. The change took place during the 
Obama administration, which at least at 
face value said it would modify its antidrug 
policy and has avoided the expression, 
“war on drugs.” The policy to crack down 
on the consumer is not unique to the 
United States. Russia, China, and other 
governments are hardliners on prohibiting 
drugs. So what are the implications of a 
Russian at the helm of the UN’s principal 
drug authority? Was there an agreement 
with the U.S. that always exercised 
great influence there? Even though the 
responses to these global problems have 
direct implications for each individual 
country in Latin America, how many media 
outlets in the region regularly report on 
them? 
In the United States, there is an ongoing 
debate on antidrug policy, especially 
around marijuana. The U.S. consumes 
more marijuana than any other country, 
and the debate has led to the legalization 
of medical marijuana in 14 states. A 
proposal for the complete legalization of 
marijuana in California, Proposition 19, 
failed in the November 2010 elections but 
brought the issue to the public’s attention. 
A constant tension exists between federal 
laws that punish the consumption of drugs, 
in some cases through irrational means like 
mandatory sentences for crack, and state 
laws. Do the Latin American media take 
care in a regular, prominent way to cover 
these crucial debates on drug policy and 
how they affect those outside the borders 
of the nation that is the protagonist in the 
“war on drugs”?  How has it happened, 
asked the director of the Drug Policy 
Alliance, Ethan Nadelman, that “one nation 
has so successfully promoted its own 
failed policies to the rest of the world?14 
These are questions that the media in the 
Americas has not attempted to answer, at 
least not in a systematic way, nor on their 
front pages. 
Recently, there has been a change in 
the news coverage that, perhaps, moves 
beyond the anecdotal. Until Proposition 
19 brought the subject to the U.S. public’s 
attention, the debate on antidrug policy 
and legalization was, to say the least, 
marginal in the Western Hemisphere’s 
media. Suffice it to recall the passing 
attention sparked in 2009 by the Latin 
American Commission on Drugs and 
Democracy. Led by three ex-presidents 
from Mexico, Brazil and Colombia, the 
commission attempted to highlight the 
failure of the “war on drugs,” and the 
immense costs their countries have paid 
in its pursuit. The commission started 
its work in March 2009 at a high-level 
(13) Martin Helsma, Drug Law Reform Trends in Latin America, 2009, TNI. Ethan Nadelman, “Drugs,” Foreign Policy, 
September–October, 2007.








ministerial meeting of the Commission 
on Narcotic Drugs in Vienna, to evaluate 
a decade of the UN General Assembly 
Special Session, which in 1998 promised 
to eliminate or significantly reduce the 
consumption of drugs in the world by 
2008. Despite the obvious failure of this 
promise and of the strategy that it has 
pursued, the meeting in Vienna and the 
entire year’s worth of outcomes and 
evaluations from academics, governments, 
and activists received little attention in the 
media in the Americas. A photo of Bolivian 
President Evo Morales defiantly chewing a 
wad of coca leaf and his rallying cry, “coca 
is not a drug” were part of the anecdotal 
coverage, which made little reference 
to the curious logic of the international 
control regime that equated coca leaf with 
cocaine, heroin, and opium on the same 
list of hazards in the UN conventions.
Several issues have won space recently 
in news coverage: the displacement of 
the drug trade’s axis to Mexico, a country 
much more important than Colombia for 
the United States; Mexican President Felipe 
Calderón’s insistence on discussing current 
drug policy; the debate on Proposition 
19; and the discussion about drug policy 
and some critical distance on the “war 
on drugs.” It remains to be seen whether 
or not this is a cyclical phenomenon or 
a long-term trend that incorporates this 
crucial element into news coverage. But 
there are increasingly more signs that 
the international debate is changing, and 
not necessarily in favor of the current 
strategies. 
  An economic, social, and cultural 
  phenomenon, or a police story?
Media, thus, deals mainly with drug 
trafficking, not drugs. The first thing that 
springs to view is that drugs are covered 
like a police beat and rarely as the highly 
complex economic, social, and cultural 
topics that they are. From a media 
organizational perspective, the subject is 
housed in the crime sections that are by 
definition journalism’s “rapid deployment” 
forces, those that go out for the picture 
and the basic data, without analysis or 
context. 
Drug traffickers are not only bandits, and 
their story should not be limited to the 
“cops and robbers” perspective presented 
across the media. When the violence 
intensifies, the coverage is frequently 
dominated by the body count syndrome, 
the unending tally that grows every day. 
But, beyond its bloody façade, the drug 
trade is an economic phenomenon with 
logics and explanations based on the 
market. The trade confronts governments 
and society at large with unprecedented 
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security challenges and a tangled enigma 
of legal and illegal economics, clandestine 
groups, and political power that are all 
essential to decipher. The media have 
made no small effort to investigate 
the links between the drug trade and 
politics, and the capacity of drug traders 
to infiltrate the authorities’ security 
organizations. But the journalist’s scalpel 
should not only conduct the autopsy of 
corruption but should also dissect the 
drug trade’s body like one of the most 
sophisticated and adaptable businesses 
in world economic history. It should 
also cover the international regime and 
strategies that gave it life and continue to 
feed it.
Drug trafficking is a social phenomenon. 
The true protagonists are not only the 
handful of bosses who win fleeting 
notoriety until their capture or death, but 
the tens of thousands of marginalized 
youth whose situations drive them to 
become assassins, “mulas” (cocaine 
smugglers carrying latex capsules in 
their bellies), raspachines (harvesters 
of coca), and the long list of anonymous 
others that dot the drug trade’s payroll. 
It is not just money behind the plot of 
the movie of organized crime, which 
drives its protagonists, supporting actors, 
and the immense legion of extras that 
compose the trade’s armies, from specific 
social sectors and according to social 
logics asking to be told. Where is the rich 
sociology of the bandit in the news, the 
drug trafficker not only as the bad guy 
but a social actor? Why have the state 
of Sinaloa in Mexico and certain regions 
of Antioquia in Colombia been so prolific 
in producing drug bosses and assassins? 
These questions have been thoroughly 
explored at the academic level, but rarely 
in the press.
The drug trade is a vast cultural 
phenomenon with its own ideology and 
icons, saints, and mantras that feed a 
counterculture for a wide swath of social 
groups. The traffickers are not characters 
within the public’s reach. They don’t write 
memoirs or give many interviews. But 
they successfully compete with the official 
narrative with the help of alternative 
means of mass communication, like 
Mexico’s forbidden “corridos” praising 
“Camelia la tejana” and the “bad herb,” 
or the ever more popular “narco-novela” 
television series. Colombia has made these 
novelas like Sin tetas no hay paraíso and 
El cartel de los sapos an export industry. 
These alternatives produce their own socio-
cultural discourse. The unceasing creativity 
of aliases—“Shorty,” “Barbie,” “Blue,” 
“Lord of the Heavens,” “Boss of Bosses,” 
“el Coss”—is a subculture that without 
greater analysis captures the imagination 
of the public and the media. The criminal 
crusade is told as a Robin Hood story, 
celebrating a macho culture of easy money 
and plentiful beautiful women, along with 
the kitsch of luxury, golden revolvers, 
extravagant villas one day, plastic surgery 
the next, that blend between secrets and 
myth, generating legends of invincibility 
and power that influence wide sections of 
the population. Famous graves like Pablo 
Escobar’s in the Montesacro Gardens of 
Itagüí, public-private altars to characters 
like Jesús Malverde or the cult of Santa 
Muerte in Mexico are cultural expressions 
of the drug trade that have thousands of 
loyal followers and often go unreported as 
bizarre anomalies. 
The sociological and ethnographic 
aspects of the drug trade and its business 
character are a vein of information waiting 









Violence itself is not properly questioned. 
There are interesting attempts that move 
beyond the macabre daily statistics. The 
maps and information on homicides related 
to the drug trade in Mexico produced by 
the Trans-border Institute of the University 
of San Diego in California are based on 
information from the daily Reforma that 
carefully compiles weekly statistics on 
“narco-executions,”15 as killings are called 
in Mexico. Diario de Juárez’s statistics on 
homicides go far beyond the simple daily 
register of victims. However, these are 
scarce pearls in the news coverage that 
rarely go beyond the body count. They 
periodically compare the numbers, but 
they rarely explore the deeper causes 
behind the violence.  
“The social dynamic of the ‘war on 
drugs,’” as J.F. String called it in his blog 
Hemispheric Brief,16 asks for explanations 
that depart from the official response 
connecting the deaths to the drug trade 
and blames them on the war between 
cartels. If the skepticism and distance 
characteristic of journalism were 
consistently applied, contradictions would 
immediately appear in the dominant 
narrative. “No one knows how many are 
dying, no one knows who is killing them 
and no one knows what role the drug 
trade has in these killings. There has 
been no investigation of the dead and so 
no one really knows whether they were 
criminals or why they died. There have 
been no interviews with heads of drug 
organizations and so no one really knows 
what they are thinking or what they are 
trying to accomplish. It is difficult to have 
a useful discussion without facts, but it 
seems to be very easy to make policy 
without facts.17 The article in The Nation by 
Charles Bowden of the University of New 
Mexico, author of a book on Cuidad Juárez, 
and Molly Molloy of New Mexico State 
University, should be required reading for 
journalists who cover the subject.
The result of assigning the drug trade beat 
to crime reporters is that society does 
not get access to an alternative narrative 
from that promoted by the authorities or 
imposed by the traffickers. The official 
narrative has made inroads in the media. 
The commander of Operation Conjunta 
Chihuahua, General Jorge Juárez Loera, 
bluntly summed up his view of the media 
coverage: “I would like to see reporters 
change their articles and instead of writing 
about the victim of the murder they should 
say, ‘one less criminal.’” The influence of 
drug traffickers on the public narrative 
was confirmed by Mexican writer and 
journalist Juan Villoro in his acclaimed 
article, “The Red Carpet of Drug Terror” in 
which he writes, “The drug trade has won 
cultural and media battles in a society that 
has protected itself from the problem by 
denying it: ‘assassins kill themselves.’”18
Where are the independent stories the 
media should offer the public? While the 
media leaves the field open to the official 
narrative and continues covering the 
“onCe these CliChés 
BeCome ConVentional 
Wisdom it BeComes Very 
diffiCult to haVe a serious 
deBate on drugs and 
antidrug poliCy Without 
falling into a moraliZing 
eXChange that Blames one 
side While eXCulpating the 
other�”
(15) See “Drug Violence in Mexico. Data and Analysis 2001-2009,” Justice in Mexico Project, Transborder Institute of the 
University of San Diego http://justiceinmexico.org/resources-2/drug-violence/ 
(16) http://www.joshuafrens-string.com/2010/10/drug-war-epistemology.html
(17) Charles Bowden and Molly Molloy, “Who Is Behind the 25,000 Deaths In Mexico?” The Nation, July 23, 2010. The book by 
Bowden is Murder City: Ciudad Juárez and the Global Economy’s New Killing Fields. Molloy maintains a virtual discussion 
list, http://groups.google.com/group/frontera-list/topics?pli=1 








subject as a crime story the drug trade 
will, as Villoro puts it, keep “striking twice: 
in the world of facts and in the news that 
rarely finds an opposing viewpoint.”19 
In this way, the authorities and drug 
traffickers compete to impose their own 
narratives on society. The media landscape 
is their battlefield, and if journalism does 
not succeed in settling on a consistent 
narrative, the media will continue to 
be a fertile ground in the fight of other 
narratives to dominate the public debate. 
The example of how violence in Mexico is 
covered can be extended to other countries 
and situations. It’s the approach that is 
important when reporting: do the media 
still owe to society, and not just in Mexico, 
those explanations and questions that lie 
at the heart of “narco-violence”?
  A complex topic, but clichés prevail
In the face of the complexity of the 
drug trade, clichés dominate the public’s 
knowledge. On both sides of the Rio 
Grande, explanations based on the 
conventional wisdom about the drug trade 
prevail. 
There are obvious clichés. To the world, 
Colombia has been for years synonymous 
with cocaine and armed conflict. Mexico 
today is known for violence and drug 
cartel wars; Afghanistan for opium and 
Taliban terrorism; the United States, for 
consumption. Each country, depending 
on the moment, is tagged with one of the 
media’s labels used in the coverage of 
drugs. It’s possible to take heart that with 
time the media could balance its coverage 
to include other topics, though this implies 
ignoring how the news cycle operates, and 
that is beyond the focus of this article.
But there are other clichés that are truly 
important to the public, often turning it 
into a dialogue between the deaf. Media 
coverage can as easily reinforce or clear 
them up.  
The first has to do with the different 
perspectives of the problem of drugs in 
the United States and the countries that 
traditionally produce them. As Francisco 
Thoumi20 has suggested, “a moral 
model” prevails in the United States that 
“demonizes drugs and the individuals 
who advocate for drug legalization” while 
in the Andean countries the prevailing 
model is one that “demonizes the United 
States and its harsh policies.” The result 
is that both positions end up “exporting 
the responsibility for the production and 
consumption [and] both sides of the 
discussion end up believing their side 
is just and good, feeling like victims of 
the other.” This has contributed to the 
reinforcement of two almost symmetrical 
clichés, not only among wide sectors 
of public opinion on both ends of the 
continent but also among those who make 
policy. On one side, the “cliché of the 
gringo” prevails in many parts of Latin 
America. This blames the problem of drugs 
on the United States and its appetite for 
drugs. If it were not for this, so goes the 
cliché, countries like Colombia, Mexico, 
(or Peru and the Dominican Republic) 
would not suffer from drug violence 
and the cartels. However, as the United 
States doesn’t take care of its own drug 
consumption seriously, the problem in the 
south has no solution. The counterpart 
is the cliché of “down there” that widely 
prevails in North American public and 
political circles, attributing the problem 
to corrupt, weak or semi-failed states 
south of the Rio Grande where groups 
of traffickers prosper unimpeded. This 
(19) Ibid.








perspective promotes a hard-line approach 
that attacks the drug problem at the 
source, a strategy that has been employed 
with varying success in Colombia, Mexico, 
Bolivia and other countries. 
A complementary cliché that the reality 
of the evolution of the drug business is 
erasing more every day is the division 
between producing and consuming 
countries, on which much current antidrug 
policy is based. Before, it was very clear 
who produced and who consumed drugs. 
Today, the biggest consumers are also 
the biggest producers. Take the United 
States for example, with marijuana and 
amphetamines. Canada has become a 
major marijuana and ecstasy exporter 
reaching all the way to Australia. 
Traditional producing countries in South 
America and Mexico have become vibrant 
consumer markets.  
Once these clichés become conventional 
wisdom it is very difficult to have a serious 
debate on drugs and antidrug policy 
without falling into a moralizing exchange 
that blames one side while exculpating the 
other. In Latin America, it is not uncommon 
to detect at the heart of some arguments a 
kind of hidden satisfaction with the actions 
of the drug traffickers that justifies them 
as some sort of “divine retribution” against 
the “gringos.” In North America there 
is often a sense of colonial superiority 
and the conviction of a besieged nation 
defending the borders of civilization against 
a backward and chaotic south.  
However, the most notable effect of 
these clichés is that they confer on 
those that share them the intellectual 
tranquility necessary to avoid asking 
difficult questions. “What is so unique 
about the United States? Why does this 
great country have such a profound and 
persistent problem with drugs, a problem 
that has, sometimes inappropriately, come 
to dominate the world’s policy toward 
drugs?” This question asked by historian 
Richard Davenport-Hines21 hits on one 
of the foci of the problem. Thoumi poses 
similar questions on the other end of the 
problem: “Very few ask themselves: why 
is it that Colombia is the center of cocaine 
production?’” And, he adds, why is the 
violence associated with the drug trade 
in Colombia so much greater than that 
of others suffering the same problem? 
Identical inquiries can be made about 
Mexico. Why is Mexico the only country 
besides Colombia to consolidate the 
production and trafficking of drugs? Why 
now? Why with record-breaking levels of 
violence? 
Do the media ask these questions in their 
countries? Do they look for explanations, 
cases, examples, and experts—that is 
to say, news—to highlight and regularly 
cover these topics and put them on the 
public agenda with high-quality debate, 
analysis, and speech? Such questions 
and the difficult answers in terms of 
the responsibility that each society 
“the aCademiC disCourse 
on drugs is usually Very 
CritiCal of the Current 
poliCies and the results of 
the “War against drugs�” 
But it doesn’t Constantly 
and prominently feed the 
neWs hole, the headlines 
and the JournalistiC 
narratiVe�”








should assume as part of the broader 
drug phenomenon would, if they were 
an integral part of the public debate, 
undermine some of the clichés on which 
current antidrug policy rests. It is not 
strange, therefore, that the public and the 
politicians don’t ask those questions if the 
media do not seem to care about them. 
Media play a huge role in contributing to 
those clichés that have (or don’t have) a 
wide audience in society.
 
There are also clichés that can be called 
auxiliary, formulated with clear political 
intentions by high-ranking state employees 
who are pursuing specific goals. The 
current situation in Mexico offers two 
examples: Colombia’s “success story,” and 
the notion of “spillover” in Mexico.
Officials in Washington and Bogotá are 
presenting what has happened under 
President Álvaro Uribe’s administration in 
Colombia as an example of the fact that 
“the war on drugs” does pay off, referring 
specifically to the need to strengthen it in 
Mexico with the Mérida initiative. This is 
a cliché because it rhetorically translates 
the advancements of the past eight 
years regarding security and against the 
armed groups as a success also in the 
fight against illegal drugs and trafficking. 
However, after a decade and almost $7 
billion of U.S. aid, despite the fact that 
the military budget has tripled and the 
military and police forces have been 
doubled to almost half a million men, the 
Andean nation continues to export about 
the same amount of cocaine that was 
exported when Plan Colombia began in 
2000. The big Medellín and Cali cartels 
have disappeared, the paramilitaries of the 
AUC, to whom Washington attributed 45 
percent of the trafficking, no longer exist 
as such after the demobilizations of 2003-
2006. The guerrillas, mainly the FARC, in 
whose territory much of the cultivation and 
processing of the drug takes place, have 
been seriously debilitated, and Colombian 
organizations have ceded their leadership—
and a substantial part of the earnings—to 
Mexican groups. But the production and 
flow of Colombian cocaine to the United 
States remains intact in the hands of what 
the police now call “baby (or boutique) 
cartels.”
The balance sheet of the “war against 
drugs” in Colombia is far from the success 
story of the “war against guerrillas” 
(which, in reality, is a lot less brilliant than 
its official version when contrasted with 
certain realities, like forced displacement 
of communities, the rapid flourishing of 
new armed groups, sustained human 
rights violations, and the violence that 
devastates some regions). The media 
outside Colombia sometimes translates 
the success in the war against guerrillas 
to the fight against drugs in Colombia, 
reinforcing the official U.S and Colombian 
discourse that would rather not see the 
black hole into which the antinarcotics 
aid has fallen. In the best scenario, if the 
cultivation of cocaine moves to Peru, and 
the Mexican traffickers completely replace 
the Colombians in the industrial and 
transportation chains toward the United 
States, the result will have been the same 
as always: to gain ground in one place 
while the problems moves somewhere 
else—the so-called “balloon effect.”
The threat of a “spillover” of drug 
violence into the United States through 
the porous border with Mexico, through 
which drugs, illegal immigrants and all 
forms of terrorism could enter, has been 
promoted actively by conservative sectors 








states and has been aired through U.S. 
media, television in particular. While 
billions of dollars are dedicated to build 
walls and fences, to install cameras and 
radar, to reinforce border patrols and send 
thousands of men from the National Guard, 
the U.S. media publish story after story 
about the permeability of the border and 
the risks that Mexico’s violence could spill 
from Juárez, Tijuana, and Reynosa into the 
United States. Until now, evidence of such 
a contagion is scarce. Mexican violence 
stops at the Rio Grande. In some cities 
like Houston and Atlanta there are isolated 
armed clashes and contract killings that 
authorities have linked to drug trafficking 
and Mexican groups, but nothing close to 
the kidnappings, homicides, massacres, 
and explosions that rack México daily. El 
Paso continues to be one of the safest 
cities in the United States. As Tom Barry 
stated in an article in the Boston Review, 
“the notion that lawlessness is taking 
over the borderlands and that the border 
needs securing at all costs, has become a 
bipartisan assumption,”22 which also feeds 
hysteria against immigrants and the feeling 
of a “besieged nation” that is so useful to 
some politicians in the United States.
Fears over the spread of Mexican violence, 
the tunnels, and the illegal immigrants who 
carry a few kilos of cocaine or marijuana 
on their backs veil problems that could 
grab more attention from the U.S. media, 
like growing corruption among police 
and border officers, or the involvement 
of traffickers in normal trade. According 
to U.S. transportation statistics, every 
day in 2009, 12,000 trucks, 190,000 
vehicles, 112,000 people, and 20 trains 
crossed the border from Mexico into the 
United States23. Doesn’t the impossibility 
of checking every vehicle and every 
person who crosses, and the possibility 
of corrupting the authorities who watch 
that traffic make the legal border at 
least as interesting as the illegal one for 
the traffickers? Which would be more 
profitable, to dig a tunnel, or to camouflage 
a few kilos of heroin in one of the 4.3 
million containers that crossed from Mexico 
into the United States in 2009?
Do the media have part of the 
responsibility for the creation and 
reinforcement of these clichés, these 
repeated discourses that install themselves 
in people’s conscience and hover over 
public debates, electoral decisions, and 
the “politically correct” lines that, when 
speaking about drugs, politicians feel they 
must not cross in order to keep their jobs? 
This is another “undesired consequence” of 
some of the paradoxes mentioned above. 
The information focuses on repeated shows 
of violence and the actions of traffickers 
and the authorities, instead of the deeper 
causes and the vast complexity of the 
illegal drug phenomenon. The result is 
that—like adhesive stickers—formulas 
based on labels and clichés are applied 
to entire nations and regions and are 
repeated time and again until they become 
common knowledge. They are the fog of 
fears oVer the spread of 
meXiCan ViolenCe, the 
tunnels, and the illegal 
immigrants Who Carry a 
feW Kilos of CoCaine or 
mariJuana on their BaCKs 
Veil proBlems that Could 
graB more attention from 
the u�s� media, liKe groWing 
Corruption among poliCe 
and Border offiCers�
(22) Tom Barry, “At War in Texas,” Boston Review, September–October, 2010, http://bostonreview.net/BR35.5/barry.php
(23) http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_statistics/#chapter_3 








the “war on drugs,” and, at least in part, 
the winds that fade—or dissipate—them 
blow from the media.
  the Academic World, 
  the reporting World
The last paradox in the journalistic 
coverage of drugs and trafficking is 
brief.  The academic world has a long, 
distinguished tradition of investigating 
drugs and many of their aspects, such 
as consumption, addiction, production, 
cultivation, and native traditions, 
chemistry, and economics. The journalistic 
world, however, is greatly disconnected 
from that tradition.
Academics are quoted in the media, and 
the juiciest facts and most compelling data 
are extracted from specialized reports like 
those of the UNODC. But daily information 
has no systematic, constant space for the 
many experts who in each country are 
investigating drugs and drug trafficking. 
Their books aren’t read by journalists, nor 
are their conferences or debates reported. 
The academic discourse on drugs is usually 
very critical of the current policies and 
the results of the “war against drugs.” 
But it doesn’t constantly and prominently 
feed the news hole, the headlines and the 
journalistic narrative. The media don’t 
seem to have a memory of the history of 
traffickers, the intricacies of consumption 
or the changing tendencies of a business 
that jumps from one country to the next. 
But in most countries impacted by drugs 
there are academics who have studied 
these elements in great detail.
This disconnection between the 
reporting and the academic worlds 
has a practical counterpoint: there is a 
similar disconnection between academic 
research and policy-makers. In the past 
few decades, political decision-making 
has flowed in an opposite direction from 
a great portion of academic production. 
Many politicians will admit, in private, 
the fissures and the lack of results of the 
current strategy against drugs. But, given 
voters’ inclinations and the prevailing 
clichés, they would prefer to continue 
sustaining it, happy to see the problem 
move out of their country to a neighboring 
one, at least temporarily. Moisés Naim, 
editor of Foreign Policy has said: “The 
Washington consensus on drugs rests on 
two widely shared beliefs. The first is that 
the war on drugs is a failure. The second is 
that it cannot be changed.”   
As a result, the public ends up with the 
more anecdotal accounts about drugs, 
and the academics are reduced to giving 
some context only when time permits. 
With the growing skepticism of the media 
regarding President Calderón’s “war 
against drug trafficking” and the lack of 
results of the strategy that he has applied 
in collaboration with the United States to 
fight the problem, experts are summoned 
to speak (critically, almost always) about 
the lack of results, the improvisation, 
and the problems that the government 
and the military are facing. This is, of 
course, an important part of the public 
debate. But it doesn’t pay attention to the 
other paradoxes mentioned above. There 
is a scarcity of articles—and academic 
sources—dedicated to expanding the 
problem further than the history of cops 
and robbers, to discussing the economy 
of trafficking, its displacements, its global 
connections, or to critically question the 
official narrative surrounding deaths and 








an appearance on the media’s daily 
agenda of concerns. In the United States, 
information for the past few years has 
been almost exclusively based on what 
happens in México. The organic links with 
what happens to the north, what happens 
with drugs once they cross the border, 
the circulation of money, the groups 
that benefit, the social and agricultural 
phenomenon of marijuana, and many 
other facets that would allow a complete 
understanding of the drug phenomenon 
are marginal in the news coverage. The 
news is Mexico, period.  It’s true that the 
news is Mexico. What’s not true is that it’s 
the end of the story.
  the Journalistic narrative on drugs
That leaves this text where it started. Is 
there an independent journalistic narrative 
about illegal drugs? The answer seems to be 
no, at least as far as the media coverage’s 
critical mass is concerned. The paradoxes 
that have dominated media coverage of 
drugs and drug trafficking have contributed 
historically, as Astorga argues, and not only 
in Mexico, to the fact that the dominant 
discourses in the field are, in general, those 
of the authorities, and in some circles, those 
of the traffickers. This has had profound 
repercussions on the quality of the public 
debate related to drugs, traffickers, and the 
policies of those who chase both illicit drugs 
and “narcos.” This only makes the need for 
an independent journalistic narrative in this 
field more pressing. It would be a narrative 
that takes the necessary distance from the 
official storyline and that would manage to 
present to society the “story” of drugs in its 
entire complexity.
The Mexican case, just like Bowden and 
Molloy state in their article, is, both 
a demonstration of the lack of that 
independent narrative, and an eloquent 
example of how the debate could move 
toward a more sophisticated news 
coverage that would see the phenomenon 
integrally:
We are told of a War on Drugs that has no 
observable effect on drug distribution, price 
or sales in the United States. We are told 
the Mexican Army is incorruptible, when 
the Mexican government’s own human 
rights office has collected thousands of 
complaints that the army robs, kidnaps, 
steals, tortures, rapes and kills innocent 
citizens. We are told repeatedly that it is a 
war between cartels or that it is a war by 
the Mexican government against cartels, 
yet no evidence is presented to back up 
these claims. The evidence we do have is 
that the killings are not investigated, that 
the military suffers almost no casualties 
and that thousands of Mexicans have filed 
affidavits claiming abuse, often lethal, by 
the Mexican army (…)
No one asks or answers this question: How 
does such an escalation benefit the drug 
smuggling business which has not been 
diminished at all during the past three 
years of hyper-violence in Mexico? Each 
year, the death toll rises, each year there 
is no evidence of any disruption in the 
delivery of drugs to American consumers, 
each year the United States asserts its 
renewed support for this war. And each 
year, the basic claims about the war go 
unquestioned.25
These are the myths of the “war against 
drug trafficking” in Mexico. They are very 
similar in their creation—and in the way 
they take root in public consciousness—to 
the myths that surround the global war 








against drugs and the national battles 
that are being waged, with great uproar 
and without much success, in other parts 
of the world. How do we change this? 
To ask questions that are uncomfortable 
and difficult to answer, to point to the 
contradictions, to question the paradoxes 
of the coverage, to expose the many 
answers and the many pieces of knowledge 
that already exist, and to put all of 
this in the public debate in a sustained 
and prominent manner. These are the 
elements that would form an independent 
journalistic narrative about the complex 
and dangerous topic of forbidden drugs. 











Pachuca, Hidalgo State—The gleaming 
cross, silvery and tubular and some thirty 
feet high, and the large modern church 
painted in bright orange, are hard to 
miss. They loom over the low-rise houses 
and the rough paved streets of Tezontle 
colonia, a working-class barrio home to 
laborers and maids in the city of Pachuca, 
Hidalgo, located about an
hour away from Mexico City.
The towering cross and the new church 
stand in stark contrast next to the original 
tattered one-story chapel built by local 
parishioners two decades ago. The new 
additions were built in 2009 thanks to 
the hefty donation of a local benefactor 
whose name appears on a metal plaque 
tucked away behind an interior wall. The 
plaque would seem to be an ordinary 
acknowledgement of someone's generosity 
if it didn't bear the name of a local man 
who left his hometown years ago to make 
something of himself: Heriberto Lazcano 
Lazcano.
Lazcano is none other than “El Lazca,” 
the crime boss of the feared military-
trained drug gang known as Los Zetas. 
He is one of the most wanted drug 
traffickers in Mexico and the target of 
a U.S. Department of Justice $5 million 
dollar reward for information leading to his 
arrest or conviction (www.justice.gov/dea/
fugitives/houston/LAZCANO-LAZCANO.
html).
His presence in Pachuca, and his generous 
gift to this church, has been widely known 
here, but it was not reported by the press 
until late October, when the Mexico City 
newspaper La Razón splashed the news on 
its front page, complete with pictures of 
the orange church and the plaque.
The reason for this silence can be best 
explained by what occurred in Pachuca on
Valentine's Day 2010.
“You got a letter,” his mother told him 
one evening after work. The journalist 
from Valle del Mezquital, a hamlet in the 
state of Hidalgo, opened the envelope and 
found out he was invited to a Valentine's 
Day party on a ranch, the Santa Inez, in 
Tepeji del Río, a nearby town. “There was 
going to be alcohol, women, and gifts for 
all the guests, everything for free,” said 
the reporter, who asked not to be named 
for fear of retribution. Several reporters 
from various media outlets in the area also 
meXiCo: the new sPiRAl of silenCe
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the power of drugs has spread like a cancer in recent years to regions not 
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received the same anonymous invitations.
He did not attend the party, but two 
friends told him what happened. A group 
of men welcomed and guided them to 
a large party room. Soon after their 
arrival, several women arrived in fancy 
cars. During the party “someone stopped 
the music and told those present that 
everything was for them: the women, the 
alcohol, the gifts,” said the reporter, who 
heard the story from two colleagues. “The 
only condition they were given was not 
mess with our business.” Soon after the 
party, reporting on drug-related violence in 
Hidalgo plummeted.
  new Bosses, new rules
It was the Zetas’ clear announcement of 
their arrival in their boss’ home state and 
their way of posting a warning to the local 
press: they were the new bosses, and 
there were new rules in town. Along with 
a decline in reporting about drug violence, 
nobody wrote about the Valentine’s Day 
party either.
The fact that the church, the plaque, 
and the party all went unreported, is an 
example of how the power of drug cartels 
has metastasized like a cancer taking over 
swaths of territory across Mexico, and 
silencing journalists along their path. In 
the northern, southern, and central regions 
of this large nation, the drug organizations 
have created black holes for news where 
little, or nothing, about incidents related to 
the brutal drug war makes it to the media.
Editorial decisions about what appears on 
the front pages of newspapers or the first
minutes of television news programs 
are today less dependent on basic 
newsworthiness, than on the whims of 
narcos who are not shy to express what 
they want printed or
broadcast. The new bosses have crafted 
relations with the media with the help of 
unwritten, and sometimes even unspoken, 
agreements between traffickers, reporters, 
and editors.
That many news stories are not seeing the 
light of day is preventing Mexico from
understanding how far and how deeply 
entrenched drug cartels have become 
throughout the country.
To measure these news black holes and 
understand the rules that have developed 
between drug cartels and the media, the 
Fundación Mexicana de Periodismo de 
Investigación (MEPI) reviewed six months 
of crime news reports in 13 regional 
newspapers published in Mexico’s most 
violent cities. MEPI also interviewed 
regional reporters who were promised 
anonymity.
  norma moreno Case
In 1986, 24 years ago, the signs of 
today's pervasive drug violence were 
only noticeable in faraway places like 
Matamoros, the Gulf border town where 
the Cartel del Golfo (Gulf Cartel) was born. 
Norma Moreno Figueroa was only 24 years 
old, but she wrote the most influential—
and much despised—column in the local 
newspaper El Popular. Her propensity to 
report rumors and innuendo when writing 
about powerful local figures had earned 
her a few enemies. Her last encounter, 
according to fellow reporters, was a 








STorieS publiShed by loCal media abouT drug TraffiCking Compared wiTh exeCuTionS
Police stories 







Executions Police stories 
that mention 
executions
January 262 16 44 2
february 236 14 42 5
march 219 34 81 9
april 245 29 52 11
may 238 40 118 9
June 254 13 41 7
nUEVo LEón (EL nortE)
Police stories 







Executions Police stories 
that mention 
executions
January 45 6 19 2
february 34 7 9 0
march 64 6 12 0
april 50 11 12 2
may 49 9 12 4
June 58 4 6 1
hidaLgo (miLEnio)
Police stories 







Executions Police stories 
that mention 
executions
January 30 6 10 5
february 34 4 9 3
march 21 14 15 8
april 17 21 9 14
may 16 15 8 8
June 41 34 6 14
morELoS (EL diario dE LoS morELoS)
Police stories 







Executions Police stories 
that mention 
executions
January 188 21 67 5
february 173 17 41 4
march 210 22 68 1
april 183 21 60 4
may 179 14 85 0
June 187 11 61 3
morELia (La Voz dE michoacán)
Police stories 







Executions Police stories 
that mention 
executions
January 48 16 27 12
february 63 16 23 8
march 70 19 29 8
april 133 46 29 32
may 169 48 21 33
June 190 23 11 20
cULiacán (EL noroEStE)
Police stories 







Executions Police stories 
that mention 
executions
January 39 3 11 0
february 33 5 23 3
march 38 1 26 2
april 52 3 27 1
may 56 2 39 1
June 70 4 28 2








STorieS publiShed by loCal media abouT drug TraffiCking Compared wiTh exeCuTionS
Police stories 







Executions Police stories 
that mention 
executions
January n/a n/a 280 0
february 58 16 226 21
march 47 23 299 28
april 40 15 248 22
may 60 27 329 31
June 36 38 260 26
c. d jUárEz (nortE digitaL)
Police stories 







Executions Police stories 
that mention 
executions
January 95 0 2 0
february 285 1 4 1
march 323 0 5 0
april 291 0 4 0
may 348 2 6 0
June 295 1 4 0
San LUiS PotoSi (PULSo)
Police stories 







Executions Police stories 
that mention 
executions
January 259 5 2 0
february n/a n/a 41 0
march 271 5 83 0
april 268 0 81 0
may 288 2 59 0v
June 276 3 98 0
nUEVo LarEdo (EL mañana)
Police stories 







Executions Police stories 
that mention 
executions
January 38 38 53 12
february 48 37 36 15
march 55 39 34 14
april 72 35 35 8
may 46 37 34 11
June 50 24 21 9
Sonora (EL imParciaL)
Police stories 







Executions Police stories 
that mention 
executions
January 178 26 11 5
february 156 10 24 0
march 210 18 26 5
april 209 20 27 6
may 193 14 39 0
June 193 25 28 5
gUadaLajra (mUraL)
© 2010 Fundación mEPi. todos los derechos reservados
* Police stories that do not mention drug trafficking
* Police stories that mention drug trafficking
* Executions








Jesús Roberto Guerra Velasco, a relative of 
Cartel founder Juan Nepomuceno Guerra. 
The next day, July 7, 1986, shortly after 
7 a.m., unknown assailants mowed down 
Moreno Figueroa and her editor, Ernesto 
Flores Torrijos, with automatic weapons. 
The crime was never solved.
The meaning of her death still resonates in 
the minds of local reporters. “That murder,” 
said a veteran reporter, “defined the limits 
of our job as journalists in Matamoros.” 
Rule number one: don’t publish the names 
of capos, said the reporter. The MEPI study 
found that Matamoros and other regions 
of the northern state of Tamaulipas which 
is still partly controlled by the Gulf Cartel, 
are veritable black holes for drug news—0 
percent of violent incidents connected to 
drug trafficking appear in news pages. The 
only exceptions are found in the Nuevo 
Laredo newspaper, El Mañana, which 
ignores drug stories from its hometown—
one of the border area's most violent—but 
carries stories on drug-related violence in 
Laredo, Texas.
“Different cartels have different methods 
for controlling the media,” said a senior 
journalist from Sinaloa, another state 
ravaged by drug violence. The methods 
that are becoming the norm across the 
country are those that started emerging 
when Moreno Figueroa was murdered in 
Matamoros. The Gulf Cartel henchmen 
created these methods and they have 
become deadlier under the Zetas when 
this group worked as Gulf Cartel enforcers. 
After their split from their former bosses, 
the Zetas have wrestled away large 
swaths of territory and imposed a new 
media order in other cities in Central and 
Southern Mexico.
MEPI reviewed crime stories published 
during the first half of 2010 in the 
following newspapers: El Noroeste 
(Culiacán), El Norte (Ciudad Juárez), Norte 
(Monterrey), El Dictamen (Veracruz), 
Mural (Guadalajara), Pulso (San Luis 
Potosí), El Mañana (Nuevo Laredo), El 
Diario de Morelos (Morelos), El Imparcial 
(Hermosillo), and the newspaper Milenio’s 
national and Hidalgo editions. The study 
measured stories that used words that are 
utilized to describe drug war incidents: 
“narcotráfico,” “comando armado,” “cuerno 
de chivo” (a popular nickname for AK-47 
automatic rifles), and so on.
Government crime statistics for the same 
period were not available, thus MEPI 
gathered data on the number of gangland 
executions in each city during the months 
studied and found stark statistics: in 8 
of the 13 cities studied, the media only 
reported 1 of every 10 drug-related acts 
of violence. In those where there were 
more stories, only 3 out of 10 were 
published. The newspapers' crime pages 
were not empty, but filled with stories 
on minor crimes not related to the drug 
conflict. In the combative daily Notiver, in 
the city of Veracruz, which is also under 
the aegis of the Zetas, the newspaper 
focused on stories on home burglaries, 
pedestrians hit by cars, or family violence. 
“We have become publicists, and only 
cover organized crime through official 
communiqués,” explained one of Notiver's 
top editors.
  the Zetas’ story
The Zetas were started by a handful of 
soldiers from the Mexican army's special 
forces unit. They were army deserters 








improved the group’s military training. 
They introduced psychological operations 
and other forms of combat expertise. 
Among the cartels, the Zetas employ some 
of the most violent methods. They were 
the first to decapitate their victims and 
leave their heads nearby, and because 
they understand the role of propaganda, 
they use the mainstream media effectively 
to gain and maintain total control over a 
territory. Their methods are beginning to 
influence how other drug cartels treat the 
media.
“The journalists could help multiply 
the force of delivery of their (the drug 
traffickers’) message,” said Eduardo 
Guerrero, a drug trafficking expert who 
works for Lantia Asociados in Mexico City. 
For the Zetas, especially, journalists serve 
as good informants, since they have access 
to high places with their press credentials.
“For the narcos, it's very important to 
communicate their message to their 
enemies and to society at large,” Guerrero 
said. According to him, traffickers have 
multiple techniques for sending messages. 
One way is in the manner in which they kill 
the victim—cut-off hands means the victim 
was a thief, for example. They also leave  
messages on pieces of cardboard left 
lying next to the bodies. And then there 
are the large banners called narcomantas 
they hang from bridges and highway 
overpasses. Some of the traffickers also 
post their messages on YouTube and 
in blogs. “But the media and national 
television are the most efficient way of 
sending a message,” added Guerrero.
The Valentine’s Day party for journalists in 
Hidalgo, also served another purpose. It 
may have been a sly attempt at registering 
the faces of some of the key reporters in 
their territory—and identifying those who 
may be easy targets for collaboration. In 
Ciudad Juárez, a veteran crime reporter 
explained how the Juárez Cartel used to 
work the same way with the local media. 
“There used to be about 20 radio, TV, and 
newspaper reporters here who worked 
for the narcos. [Today] it’s too dangerous 
to take their money,” he said. The city is 
being fought over by rival organizations 
and violence has spiked, with Juárez 
making up  20 percent of all the country's 
execution-style murders.
  the Worst drug Cartel restrictions
Today, the territories controlled by the 
Zetas and the Cartel del Golfo are the 
ones that suffer the worst drug cartel 
restrictions, according to the MEPI 
analysis. The news media in those states, 
which comprise about one third of the 
country, publish or broadcast reports on 
only  a maximum of 5 percent of all drug 
trafficking related violence. Even editors in 
the beleaguered city of Ciudad Juárez pity 
their colleagues: “The censorship there is 
100 percent,” said one editor.
Taumalipas state, in northeastern Mexico, 
is the place where both the Zetas and the 
Cartel del Golfo have flexed their muscles 
to stymie the free flow of information. 
Eight journalists from various cities in this 
state, including Nuevo Laredo, Ciudad 
Victoria, and Matamoros gathered for a 
private discussion last May and compared 
notes. All said both gangs had perfected 
their control of the media and even made 
periodic meetings with reporters and 
editors where they handed out edicts and 
instructions on how they should treat 








to be in competition as to how far they 
can push the limits, said the reporters. “I 
look forward to the day when I can be a 
journalist again” said one. Another reporter 
complained that even reporting on traffic 
accidents can run the risk of violence if 
those involved are cartel members.
In the state of Coahuila, where the cartels 
are fighting for control, the Zetas have 
pushed the envelope. The local cartel 
representative began demanding that the 
chief editor of a local newspaper bring him 
a draft of the front page every night so he 
could put a red pencil to the stories he did 
not want printed, according to a Mexico 
City editor who knew about the case.
  different manners to 
  Control the media
Last July, when drug cartel henchmen 
kidnapped three local journalists and a 
national television correspondent working 
for Televisa, in Torreón, Coahuila, the 
Mexican and international press went 
into a frenzy, out of concern that the four 
would be killed by their captors. In Sinaloa, 
however, a journalist told MEPI that when 
he learned that the kidnappers belonged to 
the Sinaloa Cartel, he knew the four men 
would walk free unharmed. It is not that 
there are good and bad cartels, he said. 
Only there are different manners to control 
the media. Murdering journalists is not 
the norm for the Sinaloa Cartel, said the 
reporter.
The Sinaloa Cartel has controlled its region 
in the northwestern part of the country for 
30 years reaching a détente with the local 
news media. There were a few murders of
journalists in the 1970s, but since then 
the group has gone on to dominate one of 
the country's  most prosperous marijuana 
producing regions and lucrative cocaine 
and heroin trafficking networks. The cartel 
is considered the richest group in the 
country. Its leader, Joaquín “El Chapo” 
Guzmán, is listed among the richest 
individuals in Mexico, according to Forbes. 
The Sinaloa press has reached a détente 
with the cartel—a non-aggression pact in 
which the media has tacitly agreed not 
to publish the names of cartel leaders, 
nor logistical details connected to cartel 
operations, according to a former official 
from the Attorney General’s office.
Together with this non-aggression 
pact, it helps that “Cartel leader Chapo 
Guzmán, has not crossed the line of killing 
journalists,” said one reporter. Along the 
limits of this détente and perhaps because 
of it, in the MEPI investigation El Noroeste, 
one of the principal dailies in Culiacán, 
the capital city of the state of Sinaloa, 
had one of the highest percentages of 
news coverage related to drug trafficking, 
publishing 3 out of 10  stories.
  Attention to the situation of 
  Journalists in provincial Cities
In 2010, a wave of murders and 
disappearances of journalists in Mexican 
states most affected by drug trafficking 
caught the nation's attention, including the 
national media. Before 2010, few national 
newspapers reported extensively on the 
disappearance or murders of journalists in 
the rest of the country. The interest arrived 
20 years too late. In 1986, the Mexican 
Association of Newspaper Editors AME, 
published a list of journalists murdered 








government at the time protect journalists 
from criminals and powerful people. 
Currently, about 30 provincial journalists 
have disappeared or been murdered since 
December 2006. One question that has 
arisen from the recent murders is why 
the press and other national institutions 
in Mexico City have failed to pay attention 
to the situation of journalists in provincial 
cities?
"There is an arrogance from Mexico City 
toward our cities,” said Alfredo Quijano, 
director of El Norte of Ciudad Juárez, who 
pointed out that there were few effective 
independent networks linking journalists in 
the capital city and the states and provincial 
cities. The kidnapping of journalists in 
Torreón, Coahuila, last July pushed the 
Mexican national press to react and say 
“basta.” But provincial journalists are quick 
to point out that the main reason there was 
nationwide media indignation was because 
one of the kidnapped journalists worked for 
the national Televisa network. While it is 
difficult to prove the truth in this assertion, 
Quijano did point out that more foreign 
journalists have come to Juárez than 
journalists from Mexico City.
The violent wave against the media has 
arrived as Mexico’s state and national 
media confront a serious financial crisis. 
Small and large news outlets have felt the 
pinch, and many national newspapers have 
reduced the number of correspondents, 
widening the gap of information between 
the capital city and the provinces. Mexico’s 
provincial media has experienced the 
worst of it. Local advertising has shrunk, 
and many local news outlets have come 
to depend more and more on local 
government advertising. In Veracruz, for 
example, many news outlets depend on 
the state government largesse, but this 
dependency leads to a shrinking number 
of stories on drug trafficking violence, 
because the Government of Veracruz does 
not want to give the image of their cities 
as  controlled by drug trafficking.
In Ciudad Juárez, Quijano said his 
newspaper lost 70 percent of its 
advertising. “We had to cut the police and 
crime section from two pages to one page. 
We also cut some reporting and editorial 
jobs, but we are surviving.”
The lack of critical reporting has prevented 
journalists from seeing how the influence 
of drug trafficking organizations advanced 
state by state, and few journalists put 
together the statistics that show how 
the media across the country was being 
silenced. The black holes on drug news 
moved across Mexico as the nation ignored 
the problem until earlier this year.
"We let the problem spread,” said one 
journalist in Veracruz. “Nobody from 
the major cities took the time or effort 
to report about the problems in the 
provinces.” Then he added: “Many accused 
the state-based media of being cowards 
and going silent; but how could they blame 












Violence in Mexico and Central America has 
increased both in frequency and intensity in 
the last eight years. In Mexico, the levels of 
violence are the highest since the Cristero 
War, a conflict rooted in religion that raged 
across the country from 1926 to 1929.
In Central America, such violence hasn’t 
been seen since the civil wars of the 1980s 
that caused hundreds of thousands of 
deaths as groups with communist and 
liberal ideologies fought for control of the 
state, especially in Guatemala, El Salvador, 
and Nicaragua.
Yet the presence of organized crime is 
not a new condition in Mexico. What is 
new however, has been the incorporation 
of techniques normally utilized in low-
intensity conflicts. At times they acquire 
elements of terrorist violence that are 
carried out by criminal groups in several 
regions. The government’s response has 
been inadequate during the period 2002–
2010. 
Executions, beheadings, dismemberments, 
attacks with fragmentation grenades and 
car bombs, and raids to execute police 
have become part of the daily routine in 
states like Chihuahua, Baja California, 
Guerrero, Michoacán, Nuevo Leon, Sinaloa, 
and Tamaulipas. A less intense version 
of this reality is also present in Oaxaca, 
Quintana Roo, and Tabasco.
Amid these circumstances, which are 
unprecedented in contemporary Mexico, 
and due to the direct association with 
violence generated by organized crime in 
other countries of the continent, several 
voices in the media have referred to the 
“Colombianization” of Mexico and now, 
Central America. However, to label the 
phenomenon this way requires a deeper 
evaluation.
To understand the gravity of the events 
that are occurring in the country requires 
quantitative and qualitative comparisons 
with other countries that, for various 
reasons, have also faced significant levels 
of violence in recent years. We must also 
understand the response by the state, and 
the structural conditions in which such 
responses occur.
the dRug wAR in meXiCo  
And CentRAl AmeRiCA:  
metAPhoRs And PARAdoXes
to establish the seriousness of the events that are happening in mexico, and 
the state’s response to those events and the structural conditions in which 
they developed, we must make quantitative and qualitative comparisons 
with other nations that recently have faced significant levels of violence. 
Like a hurricane, violence and insecurity in mexico and Central America have 
multiple causes.









From my point of view, the process 
is similar to a hurricane whose winds 
accelerate due to specific atmospheric 
conditions of pressure and temperature.
 
Like a hurricane, violence and insecurity in 
Mexico and Central America have multiple 
causes. In 2006-2007, when we made 
predictions about the increase of violence 
in Mexico, Carlos Flores and I developed 
a classification system, to distinguish 
between the different types of events, 
and we presented it to Mexican university 
students at Yale University (May 2007). 
We created nine separate categories of 
violence related to organized crime:
• deadly violence; 
• physical violence; 
• deadly violence against rivals; 
• deadly violence against third parties; 
• deadly violence against journalists and 
employees charged with enforcing the 
law;
• violence against politicians; 
• use of weapons of medium destruction; 
• generalized intimidatory deadly 
violence; and 
• deadly terrorist violence. (See Fig.1.) 


























































































































6 Violence against 
politicians x23 x24 x25 x26 x27 x28 x29 x1 x30 x31 x32
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3 deadly violence 
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2 Physical violence x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
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1  deadly violence x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x








As an analyst and a former federal anti-
drug prosecutor, I can remember many 
of the acts of violence that happened 
in Mexico between 1989 and 1999. But 
the level of violence has become so 
excessively high that it’s impossible for me 
to remember the acts of violence that have 
happened in the last three months.
What is driving this hurricane of violence?
First, the origin lies in the increase of drug 
consumption in the United States in the 
1980s, when, for example, consumption 
of cocaine jumped from 40 tons to 400 
tons a year. These estimates by U.S. 
authorities have varied over time. The 
debate about whether the demand creates 
supply, or whether the supply creates the 
demand, has a new focus today. We know 
that Pablo Escobar, chief of the Medellín 
Cartel, devised a way to popularize drug 
consumption in the United States, from 
the elites to the poor inhabitants of large 
urban centers, through the creation of 
“crack,” a smokable form of cocaine that 
can be sold more cheaply. This resulted 
in a so-called crack epidemic that caused 
thousands of deaths by overdose. It also 
explains part of the increase in crime in 
the United States from the 1980s to the 
1990s. 
Today, it is estimated that the United 
States consumes around 300 tons of 
cocaine a year. European and Asian 
markets have also grown significantly, 
according to reports by the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime.
The closure by U.S. authorities of trade 
routes through Florida for Colombian 
cocaine gave a comparative advantage to 
Mexican criminal organizations that in the 
early 1990s were able to establish a virtual 
monopoly on trafficking routes through 
Mexico. This development and the increase 
in trade between Mexico and the United 
States facilitated by the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) made it 
possible for the Mexican drug traffickers 
to control the transport of drugs through 
Mexico to the United States.
Consumption of heroin and marijuana in 
the United States remains more or less 
stable. The portion produced by Mexico 
represents approximately US$10 billion 
for Mexico when sold at retail prices in the 
United States.
The market changed significantly in the 
1990s with the introduction of designer 
drugs, such as methamphetamines, 
ecstasy, and others. Those of us who 
worked in the Attorney General’s Office 
in the 1990s can remember when Barry 
McCaffrey, the U.S. Drug Czar, correctly 
predicted that designer drugs would 
be the main problem of the future. 
We recall that in the time of President 
Vicente Fox, Mexico imported four times 
more Ephedrine than was consumed in 
the country, despite the protests of the 
International Narcotics Control Board 
(INCB) and the international community.  
We also remember the police and 
prosecutors in the 1990s who grew rich as 
a result of corruption and infiltration. 
  the unification of illegal 
  markets and the militarization 
  of criminal organizations
In Mexico, the basic problem is no longer 
exclusively drug trafficking. Los Zetas 
established highly developed control of the 
territory in the places where they worked. 








strategy for controlling territory, in which 
they charge for each one of the illegal 
services that they control. Many of them 
were originally members of the Mexican 
Army’s Special Forces Airmobile Group 
(GAFE) who deserted to join criminal 
organizations.
It is known that Osiel Cárdenas Guillén, 
who assumed leadership of the Gulf Cartel 
after Juan García Abrego was captured in 
the late 1990s, convinced the soldiers who 
were inside the Attorney General’s office 
(PGR) that they should work with the cartel 
as an armed branch.  It is said that “there 
is no worse enemy than someone who has 
been a friend or family,” and that is exactly 
what happened. The bodyguards with 
military training learned how to work as 
professional assassins and imposed their 
rule on those whom they controlled.
The model they imposed was to establish 
control of all types of criminal activity, 
town by town, city by city, and state by 
state. In some regions they employed 
the strategy of killing within seven days 
everyone who controlled all criminal 
activities: retail drug dealing, extortion, 
prostitution, human trafficking, the sale of 
stolen goods, and piracy. Afterward, they 
would “negotiate” with subordinates by 
proposing two options: you either work 
with us, or die.
Carlos Flores created a table documenting 
the number of army deserters, who 
numbered in the tens of thousands in the 
period from 2001 to 2006: 
In several parts of Mexico, Los Zetas 
called on the public to organize as local 
“franchises.” This was done, for example, 
in some parts of Zacatecas state.
 
Currently, Los Zetas control the route of 
migrants to the United States, especially 
those Central Americans who travel on 
the railroad known as the “Train of Death” 
or “The Beast” that leaves from Chiapas 
heading north. The National Commission 
on Human Rights (CNDH) has documented 
thousands of kidnappings of Central 













deSerTionS of miliTary perSonnel 2001–2006
SEcUrity inStitUtionS in criSiS
desertion of military personnel in the current 
administration (july 31, 2009): 31,202
average number of military personnel deployed in drug-
control operations every month: 45,000
Source: Secretariat of national defense’s disclosure of 









Americans. In their vulnerable position 
as migrants, they cannot report the 
authorities who are extorting them and 
who are linked to organized crime. Using 
thousands of complaints, the CNDH and 
other civil organizations and institutions 
have documented that the Mexican 
government knew about the situation and 
did nothing to prevent it. The tragedy of 
San Fernando Tamaulipas, in which 72 
migrants were killed solely to prove who 
controlled the migration route, is a crime 
against humanity.
Article 7 of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court designates as “Crimes 
Against Humanity” any act of murder, 
extermination, torture, and others such as 
enslavement, rape, and sexual abuse, when 
these represent a widespread systematic 
attack directed against a civilian population, 
with knowledge about the execution of those 
acts. This international measure affirms 
that an attack against a civilian population 
is understood as a pattern of conduct that 
involves the multiple committing of acts 
against the population, as part of a policy by 
a state or organization to commit such acts 
or to promote that policy.
The value of the trafficking of migrants 
through Mexico has been estimated at 
US$5 billion.
“La Familia” of Michoacán state is an 
organization that formed in reaction 
to Los Zetas. It united the traditionally 
small producers of marijuana in that 
state. They added a religious component 
and social services. Their expansion into 
other illicit markets, such as the cocaine 
and methamphetamines trade, or the 
expansion of kidnapping and extortion is a 
consequence of this capitalist, economic, 
criminal logic.
To be clear, drug traffickers did have 
contact with military forces before 2000. 
This has been documented in books by 
Luis Astorga. In January 2010, Proceso 
magazine disclosed the statements made 
by Vicente Carrillo Leyva, heir to the 
Juárez cartel, before prosecutors working 
for the Assistant Attorney General for 
Special Investigations and Organized 
Crime (SIEDO). He spoke of the contacts 
his father had with military officials who 
have already been tried in military and civil 
trials. The remarkable part of that report 
is that none of the business or financial 
contacts went to trial. This supports what 
the government maintains: that drug 
traffickers are businessmen.
  Caring for the garden in 
  mexico and the united states
Mexican politicians and public officials 
who want to demonstrate their patriotism 
in front of U.S. authorities like to pose 
these questions: Why don’t we speak of 
American cartels? Why do we only speak 
of Mexican, Colombian, or Jamaican 
organizations but never of the American 
ones?  There is even speculation about a 
so-called “magic trailer” full of cocaine that 
has disappeared on the border because the 
U.S. authorities can’t find it.
These questions demonstrate a lack of 
knowledge about how authorities work in 
the United States and other countries with 
similarly strong governments and liberal 
democracies.
First of all, U.S. criminal organizations, 
like the Mafia in the 1990s, were, in fact, 
prosecuted under the federal Racketeer 








(RICO) Act that was enacted in 1970. 
Similarly, criminal charges have, in fact, 
been made against U.S. organizations, as 
represented by the case of the American 
gangster who trafficked heroin in military 
airplanes that transported supplies in the 
Vietnam War. The United States’ antidrug 
strategy is like having a garden, but 
trimming it constantly without letting it 
grow out of control.  
Mexico and Central America, with 
the exception of Costa Rica, are like 
a neglected garden where the grass 
has become bushes, the bushes have 
become trees, and the roots of the trees 
are spreading under the foundation, 
threatening to destroy the house.
On the other hand, we also hear Mexican 
officials complain about the money from 
drug sales that encourages corruption in 
Mexico, and about the arms that flow from 
the U.S. to Mexico.  However, nothing 
is done against money laundering. Nor 
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is anything done to dismantle criminal 
enterprises, or to end the arms flow 
to Mexico. The officials try to shift the 
blame while at the same time, they take 
advantage of the criminal activity.
  metaphor for the war 
  that generated a war 
The paradigm of a war on drugs and 
drug trafficking used by the Mexican 
government has been its biggest 
mistake, because drugs and drug 
trafficking have always existed and will 
continue to exist. Drugs are found in 
the United States, Canada, Europe, and 
almost every country in the world, but 
those societies have not exploded with 
the violence that Mexico is experiencing 
despite the fact that their drug markets 
are more valuable than Mexico’s. In 
those countries, the criminal policy model 
represents a model for the regulation of 
illegal markets, in order to minimize the 
damage on society.
On his recent visit to Mexico to receive 
an honorary doctorate from the National 
Institute for Penal Sciences, Professor 
Luigi Ferrajoli of Italy pointed out that the 
war on drugs had been one of the most 
determining factors in the explosion of 
violence in the country. First, he said, to 
use the expression “war” legitimizes the 
groups that are in “combat” for control 
of territory and that have no remorse 
for killing.  Second, he added, because 
it incites security forces to use bellicose 
strategies that don’t take into account 
the international standards for the use of 
force.
  
On one occasion before several 
prosecutors, a collaborating witness 
declared that in 1992, Ramón Arellano 
Felix had planned the murder of rival 
Chapo Guzmán on a chalkboard, 
brainwashing his hired assassins with the 
warning that Guzmán was a danger to the 
country. This is the kind of legitimizing 
power that “war” holds. For that reason, 
since 2007, our team consisting of Ernesto 
Mendieta, Gleb Zingerman, and Edgardo 
Buscaglia, has worked on projects that 
were compiled in the book The Reason 
Behind Force and the Force of Reason: on 
the Legitimate Use of Violence (La razón 
de la fuerza y la fuerza de la razón: sobre 
el uso legitimo de la violencia). The book 
demonstrates that the rulings by human 
rights courts do not distinguish between 
civilians and the military in the standards 
that should be applied to the functions of 
public security.
Judging from their actions, Mexico’s 
organized crime groups are unfamiliar 
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with the regulations of humanitarian law 
treaties that are valid even in internal 
conflicts. For example, an Additional 
Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 
1949, which relates to the protection 
of victims of non-international armed 
conflicts, states: “All persons who do not 
take a direct part or who have ceased 
to take part in hostilities, whether or 
not their liberty has been restricted, are 
entitled to respect for their person, honor 
and convictions and religious practices. 
They shall in all circumstances be treated 
humanely, without any adverse distinction. 
It is prohibited to order that there shall be 
no survivors.”
The second statement explicitly prohibits, 
at any time and place, attempts against 
one’s life, in particular homicide, torture, 
and mutilation, the taking of hostages and 
acts of terrorism, slavery, and the slave 
trade in any forms. It establishes that 
children will be provided the care and help 
they need. Once these issues reach the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
Mexico will receive its sentence. 
  the feudalization of mexico
The arrival of democracy in the country, 
first through the election of opposition 
mayors and then governors generated 
the alternation of parties in power. In the 
book Public Security in Mexico (Seguridad 
Pública en Mexico), we mentioned this 
as a serious problem for public safety. In 
2000, the rise to power of the National 
Action Party generated an alternation 
in the presidency, but not a transition. 
No laws were enacted to transform the 
country, not in politics, in security, in the 
management of justice, nor in the fight 
against corruption. 
One of the processes that have increased 
insecurity and violence in the country is 
the thesis that organized crime should only 
be combated by the federal government, 
not by the states.
This thesis formed part of the negotiations 
in the reform of public security and justice 
in 2008.
The problem is that many governors, 
who didn’t understand the concept or 
use of this law against organized crime, 
maintained that they had no reason to 
investigate common law crimes committed 
by members of organized crime. 
Constitutional reform remained incomplete 
without measuring the consequences, and 
today no one knows for sure what the 
Constitution says.
The rush to reform negotiations, without 
understanding the consequences, 
generated a framework that serves to 
highlight its irresponsibility. During the 
negotiations, Deputy Andrés Lozano 
explained to PAN senators how it 
would not be possible to determine the 
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existence of federal organized crime and 
extraordinary organized crime. The reality 
is that currently the two frameworks 
function in both the federal and state 
realms.
However, those governors who want 
to justify their incapacity in this area 
do so by abdicating their constitutional 
responsibilities and delegating them to 
the Federation. It can be shown that the 
governors who didn’t use this strategy 
have been able to contend with the crisis 
of violence in the country. Those who 
used it, such as in the case of Chihuahua 
state, committed grave errors in their 
processes of reforming codes of criminal 
procedure and their practical application. 
Inefficiencies were created, crime 
increased, and those states exploded.
The Mexican government currently tries 
to demonstrate to the United States that 
only the Institutional Revolutionary Party 
has links to the narcotics trade. However, 
the known cases indicate that all parties, 
without exception, have documented 
connections to drug trafficking.
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  the state of the state
Along with Carlos Flores, we have pointed 
out that organized crime does not create 
the model of government. Rather, it is 
the model of government that creates 
the type of organized crime that affects 
a society. In addition, it is the weakness 
of the state that is the cause of the 
extremely violent organized crime that we 
have. But that weakness also is reflected 
in other elements as well. 
It is reflected by politicians who are 
involved in electoral fraud and illegally 
financed campaigns (documented in 
rulings by the Electoral Court of the 
Federal Judicial Police), and by the 
businessmen who fight each other in court 
over the lack of regulations to generate 
economic competitiveness. It is also 
reflected in the fact that in Mexico taxes 
are collected on less than 10 percent of 
the gross domestic product (GDP). Alicia 
Barcenas, ECLAC Executive Secretary, has 
called the country a de facto paradise of 
fiscal corruption and mismanagement. 
  terrorist acts committed 
  by non-terrorist groups
This is the paradoxical thesis that the Mexican 
government defends since September 16, 
2008, when grenades were used against 
the civilian population in a public plaza in 
Morelia. Edgardo Buscaglia correctly identified 
these acts as terrorism, speaking on Carmen 
Aristegui’s program on CNN en Español. 
Acts committed by criminal organizations 
in these cases are, without doubt, terrorist 
acts, because they seek to generate 
fear within the population so that the 
Government, or other institutions, would act 
or fail to act in compliance with the law.
Consequently, both the criminal 
organization and its members should be 
included in the lists of terrorist groups 
that are registered by the United Nations 
Security Council. The effect would be 
that the organization’s operations in the 
world, and especially its commercial 
transactions and property, would be 
subject to scrutiny by all members of the 
United Nations, for their classification as 
terrorist entities. This categorization would 
allow for the confiscation of their property, 
which is what would ultimately limit their 
broad economic capacities to continue 
committing crimes. The use of force alone 
has already proven, as in the case of the 
massacres to which we have referred, that 
it will not generate conditions of security, 
peace, and tranquility in society.  
  Casino politics
The major problem in Mexico and Central 
America is that political campaigns 
are financed with illegal monies. The 
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government contributes approximately 
US$70 million to presidential campaigns, 
but their cost can total USD$ 400 million or 
more.  
People must ask themselves where the 
funding for these resources originates. The 
answer is: from corruption, and from illegal 
contributions by business and organized 
crime. This happens not only in Mexico, but 
in several parts of Central America.
In the United States, Barack Obama 
spent US$ 700 million on his presidential 
campaign. The difference is that the 
Mexican economy is less than 4 percent of 
the United States’ gross domestic product. 
This means the cost of a campaign in 
Mexico is more than 20 times than what is 
proportionately spent in the United States.  
In addition, the United States has solid 
institutions to fight any violation of the 
regulations governing election financing. 
Neither Mexico nor Central America can 
depend on such institutions, and as a 
result, those countries have been infiltrated 
by crime which, on occasion, determines 
public policies.    
We should recall that in Mexico, some 
see politics as “casino politics,” in which 
everything is placed on the table, like in 
a card game where one can win or lose 
everything. There are no cooperative 
games constructed that allow everyone to 
win something.
Across the world, political parties win and 
lose elections as part of the nature of the 
democratic game. The rule is that the 
loser of an election can seek to win the 
next elections. However, the destructive 
messages in Mexico categorize the enemy 
as a danger, leading to attempts to 
eliminate the enemy.
If 2 million people engage in the 
destruction of the government, they will 
destroy the country. It is not popular 
knowledge that the Mexican Revolution 
was conducted by slightly more than 
100,000 men, but they caused more than 
a million deaths. The National Defense 
Secretariat (SEDENA) estimates that 
more than 500,000 men work directly or 
indirectly in trafficking. Imagine if they 
decided to start a war.  
For such reasons, Mexican politics is not 
based on regulations that distribute power 
democratically, but on rules of winning 
and winning, even at the cost of receiving 
illegal money.  This is why organized crime 
in the country has such strength.   
  the “business logic” 
  of drug trafficking
Some advisors to the Mexican Government 
maintain that drug traffickers are 
businessmen but fail to recognize that they 
receive economic benefits or other material 
benefits from their illegal activities, as 
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noted in the Palermo Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime.  These 
advisors question how it is possible that 
“businessmen,” in order to develop their 
enterprises, are involved in illegal activities 
and risk everything in order to wage war 
against their rivals. Such behavior, they 
agree, violates business logic, which 
demands processes of equilibrium, based 
on Adam Smith’s “invisible hand of the 
market.”  
We should remember that even those 
businessmen who are not involved in 
prima facie illegal activities have created 
the current financial crisis that created 
the present recession. Let’s imagine the 
significance of the crisis for control of 
illegal markets.  
  the strategy that is not a strategy
In the war against drug trafficking in 
Mexico, only the military component 
of the strategy was planned. It was 
not understood that there are other 
subsystems that require support to 
reach their goals: public security and 
social development, investment, and 
transformation of institutions. This led to 
many errors being committed.
The Mexican government has made errors 
such as not fighting against corruption and 
the infiltration of organized crime inside 
the government. This also is the product 
of the weakness of the state, such as 
failing to combat money laundering and to 
dismantle the businesses and corporations 
that exist to finance criminal activity.
 
Additionally, local strategies have not 
been implemented in municipalities that 
lack the necessary resources to promote 
social change. The changes that have 
occurred in Colombia would have been 
inconceivable if, at the same time that 
the central government was working with 
the security forces, municipalities had not 
advanced in social policies and techniques 
that involved defusing one of their principal 
problems: young people who had joined 
criminal gangs because they lacked other 
opportunities.
The struggle to recover Mexico should 
be done neighborhood by neighborhood, 
municipality by municipality, state by 
state. The adoption of policies to end this 
situation of violence requires elements 
of democratic consensus on a least four 
points, applied at the three levels of 
government–federal, state, and municipal. 
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capacity to confront violent groups
2. Adjustment of the regulatory framework 
to specifically address organized crime 
and/or terrorism
3. Dismantling of the structure of corruption 
that enables the operation and survival 
of this type of crime; and
4. Attacks on the illegal proceeds of 
these organizations and their money 
laundering techniques, which should 
be accompanied by a supportive and 
broad social movement, like in Italy and 
Ireland.  
Needless to say, all of these measures, 
especially the last two, require all the 
political will from the highest levels of 
public decision-making, and that this 
translates into support and backing for the 
officials responsible for implementing these 
policies. It is important to underscore that 
in many countries there is a true threshold 
of violence that often serves as the catalyst 
of definitive measures to begin to reduce 
its indexes.
  the consequences
It should be noted that international 
experiences demonstrate that violence 
associated with organized crime can be 
diminished. In that sense, the cases of 
Colombia, the United States, South Africa, 
Italy and Ireland, are all significant.  
None of these countries has been able to 
eradicate the transnational drug market 
nor organized crime, phenomena that 
appear to have a concomitant existence in 
contemporary society. Such a claim might 
appear utopian in itself. However, those 
countries have managed to lower their 
rates of violence to the point where they 
are no longer the principal reason for social 
unrest. Nor do they represent a deliberate 
risk to national security.  
The measures applied by these countries 
were successful not only because of their 
comprehensive nature, but also because 
they were able to secure the political 
support from the highest levels of public 
decision-making. This aspect cannot 
be overemphasized. It involves—in the 
context of effective democracy to which 
we aspire—the degree of tolerance that 
our society is willing to concede to criminal 
violence.
In Ireland, the assassination of journalist 
Verónica Guerin in 1996 at the hands of 
organized crime was enough for society 
to lose its patience.  Her death launched 
a direct war against organized crime 
because of a comprehensive government 
policy supported by the highest levels of 
government and its citizens. This happened 
even in a society that had lived in a 
situation of social anxiety due to continual 
terrorist acts, since the first half of the last 
century.  
Therefore, we recognize that state 
weakness is what provokes the current 
situation. We affirm without a doubt that 
to strengthen the state is a priority that 
requires not just police control, but a 
political agreement toward a transition 
that involves rules for a peaceful existence 
in the country. Such an agreement would 
include:
a) respect for regulations concerning the 
financing of political campaigns, without 
the political system forcing politicians 
to participate in the illegal funding of 
campaigns;
b) respect for regulations concerning economic 








c) regulations concerning the financing 
of states and municipalities that would 
allow them to fulfill their constitutional 
functions;
d) campaigns against corruption and 
infiltration of public institutions, and 
prosecution of businesspeople who break 
the rules;
e) independent judicial and prosecutorial 
powers;
f) efficient municipal, state, and federal 
police who do not replicate political 
corruption; and
g) a fiscal pact that grants resources to 
strengthen the State.
In summary, these are the elements that 
will allow us to go from alternation to 
transition. They can also be suggested 
as applicable in Guatemala and other 
Central American countries, and they are a 








A criminal enterprise of “shared risk”
At the beginning of the 1990s, the payment made to Mexican drug organizations 
was US$3,500 a kilo of cocaine, then it became a percentage of the shipment. First 
it was 35 percent of the shipment; then in 1993 it became 50 percent, explained 
Carlos Resendez Bertoluci, a witness in the case of Juan García Abrego in Houston, 
Texas.
The system of redistributing risk that Colombians used to transport cocaine 
through Mexico is called apuntes. A Colombian trafficker explained the system to 
me. He survived being executed after a .22-caliber bullet that was shot at him 
ricocheted and killed another man. At the end of the 1990s, the Juárez cartel 
executed people utilizing techniques from the dirty war. Compared to those days, 
the violence has intensified and includes beheadings and car bombs.
The same collaborator told me that he had once transported a shipment of 600 
kilos in a “joint venture” that involved many partners. The same concept of shared 
risk was similar to how the entrepreneurs of Seville’s House of Trade operated in 
the 16th to 18th centuries, and to Dutch trading and shipping in the Orient.
Of the 600 kilos, 250 belonged to the Colombians. Another 250 kilos of the 
same shipment belonged to the Juárez cartel, which at the time was working 
with the Sinaloa cartel, forming part of a larger federation of Mexican criminal 
organizations, separate from the Arellano Felix organization. If the shipment were 
intercepted on the high seas, the Colombians would assume the risk.
The remaining 100 kilos (of the 600 total) were reserved for the person who had 
made the contacts and secured the deal. He received the 100 kilos on credit, at a 
price of $1,000 per kilo.  Later, he sold the drugs for $5,000 per kilo, or $500,000 
total. His profits were $400,000 from the deal.
He had made the trip in 36 hours in a motorboat with a motor typically used by 
fishermen. Asked why he hadn’t transported the shipment through Mexico and 
sold the drugs on the border he stated, “The Mexicans control the territory. If 
you try you get death or jail.”  This is the effective implementation of a rule that 









Violence in mexico, an act that had been anticipated
In his book Socio-political Aspects of Drug Trafficking (Aspectos Sociopolíticos 
del Narcotráfico, INACIPE, 1992), Professor Marcos Kaplan predicted exactly 
what would happen in Mexico and Central America. At the time, he was called an 
alarmist.
Following the same line of argument, Ernesto López Portillo and I wrote the book 
Public Security in Mexico: Problems, Perspectives, and Proposals (“Seguridad 
Pública en Mexico: Problemas, perspectivas y propuestas,” UNAM, 1995). We 
pointed out that the country would face severe threats due to the political change 
and the corruption among the police and prosecutors. Rereading the book today 
reiterates how little Mexico has advanced and how much remains to be changed. 
Ernesto Zedillo’s administration, especially the Specialized Unit against Organized 
Crime (UEDO), broadened the horizons of the application of the law. The arrival of 
Vicente Fox was marked by democratic optimism, but halfway through his term, it 
became clear that he didn’t know how to construct a country of laws. Since 2007, 
the analyses and reflections provided by Edgardo Buscaglia, Carlos Flores, and 
myself, made on CNN en Español with Carmen Aristegui and on the radio, have 
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